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Executive Summary 
 
Between 1978 and 1998, manufacturing shed three million US jobs, but output rose by 
nearly 40 percent.  In just the seven years since 1998, the sector has shed four million 
more jobs, and output is only slightly higher.  We unambiguously deplore these losses, 
both for the pain they have brought to millions of displaced workers, their families, and 
communities, and for their implications for majority living standards. Absent an unlikely 
revolution in U.S. trade policy that materially redirects large firms’ sourcing, high-wage 
American manufacturing seems destined to continue to stagnate or shrink, perhaps quite 
rapidly.  Millions of the jobs it still provides may be driven to extinction by lower-wage 
domestic production, or by low-price alternatives abroad.   
 
Our work convinces us that, even absent trade policy friendlier to onshore production, a 
large number of high-wage, family-supporting factory jobs can and should be saved.  
(We recognize that many manufacturing jobs are not good jobs, and indeed argue for 
paying less attention to the companies that offer such employment.)  We believe that we 
discern the outlines of an industrial model – encompassing manufacturing economics, the 
tools of lean manufacturing, and public and private purchasing policy – that stands a 
chance of helping many manufacturing companies increase productivity by enough to 
afford the skilled, empowered labor that the model requires and to succeed onshore.  For 
want of a better term, we call this new model “full-utilization learning lean,” or “FULL.”  
The phrase is meant to connote: 
 
• Full utilization: High and relatively steady demand that permits expensive, high-
precision machinery to be kept busy a high proportion of the 8,760 hours in a year  
• An emphasis on learning, i.e., the process is designed to increase knowledge and 
embed decision-making and authority in the hands of hourly workers.  This 
learning aspect of “FULL” has sometimes been referred to as high-performance 
work organization (HPWO); indeed, we use the term “learning/HPWO” in our 
case studies and international union discussion later in this paper. 
• The thoroughgoing use of the full toolkit of lean manufacturing methods2 – from 
5S to visual management to value-stream mapping to one-piece flow 
                                                 
1 The authors acknowledge the generous support of the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation and, for the modeling 
work underlying the regional trade analysis, the Ford Foundation.  Views expressed are those of the 
primary authors alone. 
2 We recognize that the term “lean” is unpopular in some union circles.  But we believe that leanness is 
increasingly a ticket to play in manufacturing, and hence not an option.  As we demonstrate, non-union 
plants – including some with low and moderate wages – can do quite nicely with a top-down, low-
 
This FULL model can, and sometimes does, confer an advantage for unionized 
manufacturers; indeed, we argue that international unions and central labor councils need 
to understand, support, and promulgate replicable models for their locals to use in 
implementing FULL.  
 
Based on nearly 100 case studies, including 17 conducted exclusively for this project, we 
have concluded that “the thoroughgoing use of the full lean toolkit” is most effective 
when the workforce is skilled and empowered.  Because of advantages in skill, collective 
voice, and protection against arbitrary discipline and discharge, unionized plants could 
enjoy a marked advantage in implementing and sustaining FULL manufacturing3, 
particularly if they are competently supported by regional, national, and international 
union bodies. 
 
We think the best opportunity to try this new model is in the component sector, and that 
the best place to do so is in the Great Lakes region that hosts the largest proportion of 
high-wage component jobs.  
 
The very fact that a relatively high-wage component sector continues to exist in this 
region offers a basis for hoping that the sector can be even more successful in the future, 
if and as its better firms upgrade.  And many of them need to do so.  Much of the 
appearance of a strong rebound in manufacturing productivity growth comes from sharp 
increases in output per hour worked in a few electronics-intensive subsectors.  Much of 
component manufacturing continues to have productivity that is too low, and not growing 
fast enough.  Companies and unions both have to address this fact. 
 
We call on local unions to insist that their employers upgrade, and that they do so in ways 
that embed knowledge and authority in the workers.  We call on international unions to 
champion employer upgrading following the “FULL” model, to advocate that their locals 
be active in such upgrading, and to have staff expertise to support locals engaged in it. 
 
We propose bold new policy initiatives for Great Lakes region governors, state 
legislators, county commissioners, and mayors in this region that provide, we argue, a far 
superior alternative to the smokestack-chasing, high tech-mongering, and accelerating 
sprawl to which past economic development models have led.  By focusing on the 
minority of firms that demonstrate a commitment to large productivity growth, scarce 
state resources can still generate large returns.  Focusing further on firms paying higher 
wages also makes good fiscal sense, as labor income is far less subject than profits or 
dividends to “leaking” out of the region. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
participation version of lean.  Our task is not to disparage a proven set of techniques, but to apply them 
better while mobilizing politically to reserve more of demand for higher-wage companies.   
3 See Sandra E. Black and Lisa M. Lynch, "How to Compete: The Impact of Workplace Practices and 
Information Technology on Productivity," Review of Economics and Statistics, vol. 83, no. 3 (August 
2001), pp. 434-445. 
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We propose a sharp increase in the provision and funding of direct training and technical 
assistance supports to high-paying employers that purchase heavily within the region.  In 
addition, we call for tax incentives to be restructured and reserved for such firms. 
 
Our approach offers a way forward: 
• For international unions: Stymied in their attempts to “level the playing field” in 
national trade policy, the FULL model offers them at the state and regional level a 
proven model for firm upgrading and a labor-friendly agenda for governors and 
state legislators.  It also demands that they understand what constitutes real 
upgrading in the manufacturing sectors in which their members work, and thereby 
offer more real value to employers in those sectors. 
• For local unions: A state and regional agenda, across unions, and a set of 
blueprints for making their members’ jobs more secure and their companies 
better-run 
• For state and local governments: A far higher return on the economic 
development dollar, as unaffordable across-the-board tax incentives are replaced 
by targeted assistance to only the best employers that is tied to in-region 
purchasing and other standards of behavior. 
 3
Introduction 
 
The Advanced Manufacturing Project (AMP), working with a grant from the Alfred P. 
Sloan Foundation, was originally created to research the changing relationships among 
manufacturing firms. As indicated in their final report to the Sloan Foundation, 
“Component Manufacturing: Creating an Advanced Manufacturing Sector” (March 
2004), AMP researchers documented evolving strategies of original equipment 
manufacturers (OEMs) with respect to their suppliers, as well as the responses of these 
suppliers to the actions of their usually larger and more powerful customers. We believe 
that these suppliers, many of which are so-called small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs), constitute their own sector of the economy.  Not only is this “components 
sector” where many of the jobs and much of the manufacturing output in the economy are 
located, but it is also the most newly and profoundly exposed to global competition. 
While OEMs often benefit from global sourcing by getting lower-cost inputs (including 
from former US suppliers that those customers have insisted develop a “more global 
footprint”), most component suppliers in the US are small and lack the desire or 
capability to manage offshore operations.  As the globalization process continues apace, 
the US components sector continues to restructure as suppliers struggle to maintain or, in 
many cases, regain global competitiveness. In conjunction with the AFL-CIO Working 
for America Institute (WAI), AMP returned to the Sloan Foundation to examine the 
impact of component-sector restructuring on workers and unions, and to try to understand 
the roles that unions have played, and could play in the future, in promoting forms of 
restructuring that foster stable or growing high-productivity businesses offering high-
wage jobs. 
 
Since this project began, the situation facing many onshore manufacturers has gone from 
challenging to dire.  As noted, just since 1998, the sector has shed four million more jobs 
– a shocking 23 percent of the total in just seven years -- while onshore output has 
stagnated.  Many more jobs are on the chopping block but, we believe, can still be saved. 
 
The balance of this paper explores what it would take to revitalize the component 
manufacturing sector of the economy, starting in its most important region, and make it 
work for workers, unions, and communities. 
 
The Component Sector 
 
Most assemblers of complex products – from cars to computers – buy at least half the 
value of their products from component suppliers.  In terms of manufactured content, the 
component portion is often much higher: for example, a $500 Dell PC includes about 
$300 in purchased components.  For a $3,000 John Deere lawn tractor, such components 
approach $1,800.  In a $25,000 Ford truck, they account for about $14,500. 
 
AMP researchers spent considerable time sorting the US SIC and NAICS systems into 
five buckets, including components.  Our basic definition was simple: if input-output data 
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show clearly that most of an industry’s output is bought not by the wholesale or retail 
sectors but by other manufacturers, then that industry is either in materials or in 
components.  Appendix 1 shows our sort of the US SIC system, including our detailed 
definition of the component sector.  (Note: A few of the subsectors counted in 
“components” in Appendix 1 are not included in our analyses based on Current 
Population Survey [CPS] data, which include only component industries in SIC codes 
301-3769.  Much of what is excluded – apparel, paper and wood, printing, chemicals, and 
instruments – are sectors in which components have a low weight, or in which the SIC 
and NAICS definitions make it impossible to separate components from finished goods.) 
 
To return to the Dell PC example, besides its $300 in components, it embodies about 
$100 in marketing, distribution, and technical support cost, but less than $25 in Dell 
manufacturing labor and overhead.  It is also worth noting that more than $150 of the 
$300 in purchased components come from offshore, with the a majority of the rest 
coming from Intel chipsets that embody heavy foreign content.6   
 
In contrast, mechanical (as opposed to electrical/electronic) components, partly because 
their typical lower value-to-weight ratios are lower than for electronic components, tend 
to remain clustered in the same areas as the customers that buy them, though global 
sourcing is making this less and less true.  In contrast to Dell’s PCs, the assembly plants 
of Caterpillar, John Deere, and the US-based automakers remain a huge market for 
onshore component producers.  A US-assembled car gets more than 60 percent of its 
value from component suppliers (many selling parts into the subassembly facilities of 
huge “tier one” suppliers), and nearly 75 percent of that 60 percent comes from US 
component suppliers.  (Much of the other 25 percent comes from southern Ontario -- 
which from an economic geography standpoint, should probably be thought of as a US 
state – and from the Mexican plants of GM’s former parts division, Delphi.) 
 
Thus, on a dollar basis, the onshore component sector is dominated by mechanical 
components.  The firms in this sector are concentrated in three regions:  
1. The swath of real estate within about an hour’s drive of the line between Boston 
and Philadelphia;  
2. The Upper Great Lakes states (Wisconsin, Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, and Michigan, 
plus southern Ontario, extreme western New York, slices of Iowa and Missouri on 
Illinois’ western border, and metropolitan Louisville); and 
3. A large portion of the southeast, including the Carolinas, Georgia, northern 
Alabama and Mississippi, Tennessee, and the balance of Kentucky. 
In the first of these, the sector is a declining share of manufacturing and the economy, 
and there is relatively little sectoral specialization.  In the third, the sector is growing 
rapidly and, quite intentionally, in precisely the subsectors in which the Upper Great 
Lakes region has long specialized: auto parts (including engines, transmissions, axles, 
and stampings)7 and a sector we will simply call “equipment,” which is made up of 
construction, farm, and garden equipment and their parts, plus machinery used in 
                                                 
6 In this context, consider how little a governor would really get for his or her state in winning the next 
Dell, Gateway, HP, or eMachines warehouse/assembly plant. 
7 NAICS code 3363 
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manufacturing metal and plastic products.8  Thus, in addition to the challenges faced by 
component manufacturers by the growing capacity and capability of low-wage offshore 
producers, there is intense inter-regional rivalry within the US.  As we shall soon see, 
retaining and growing a high-productivity, high-wage US component sector will require 
policies that directly confront this domestic rivalry which, as we shall also see, is a 
metropolitan versus rural as well as a Great Lakes states versus upper southeast 
competition.  The “upper southeast” is making a play to replace the Upper Great Lakes in 
their core sectors, and is doing so by playing on its lower wages, lower unionization, and 
lower concern with regulations.   
 
Employment, Union Presence and Productivity in US Component Manufacturing 
  
Employment Trends in Components and in Manufacturing As a Whole 
 
Employment in component manufacturing has grown more rapidly than overall 
manufacturing employment since the 1970s (figures 1 and 2).  Indeed, component sector 
employment grew by 5 percent between 1970 and 2002, while manufacturing 
employment as a whole fell by 13.7 percent. In 1970, 16.3 percent of all manufacturing 
workers were employed in components, while by 2002 that figure had risen to 19.8 
percent (figure 3).  Despite all the talk about outsourcing of parts by large companies, as 
of 2002 more of this had occurred in those large companies’ assembly operations than in 
intermediate goods.  This makes components a somewhat better bet for an upgrading 
strategy than trying to save, or win new, assembly facilities. 
 
Since 1998, it appears, even though many large firms have continued to “unbundle” non-
core activities and devolve them to component supply firms, this effect has been more 
than offset by increased offshore sourcing.  One telltale sign: the number of US 
manufacturing plants rose every year from 1967-1998 but has fallen every year since. 
 
 
                                                 
8 NAICS codes 3331 (agricultural, construction, and mining equipment), 3332 (industrial machinery), 3333 
(service industry machinery), 3334 (heating and cooling equipment), 3335 (metalworking equipment, 
including tooling and machine tools), and 3336 (engines and turbines, including all diesel engines).  The 
inclusion of NAICS codes 3333-3334 is somewhat off target analytically, but both trade statistics and the 
REMI model – about which much more below – aggregate the sector in a way that forces us to include 
them. 
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Figure 1.  Employment, All 
Manufacturing, 1970-2002 
(thousands)
0.0
5,000.0
10,000.0
15,000.0
20,000.0
25,000.0
19
70
19
76
19
82
19
88
19
94
20
00
All
manufacturing
 
Source: Authors’ analysis of Bureau of Labor Statistics Quarterly Census of  Employment  
and Wages, with all data converted to an approximate NAICS basis by Economy.com. 
 
Figure 2.  Employment, Component 
Sector, 1970-2002 (thousands)
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Source: Authors’ analysis of Bureau of Labor Statistics Quarterly Census of Employment 
and Wages, with all data converted to an approximate NAICS basis by Economy.com 
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Figure 3.  Component sector 
employment as share of all 
manufacturing employment, 1970-2002
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Source: Authors’ analysis of Bureau of Labor Statistics Quarterly Census of Employment 
and Wages, with all data converted to an approximate NAICS basis by Economy.com 
 
Comparing business cycle peak years during this period, component sector employment 
always outperformed manufacturing employment as a whole.  Employment in component 
manufacturing rose more rapidly than employment in all manufacturing from 1972-79, 
fell at a slower rate than all manufacturing employment from 1979-89, and rose from 
1989-2000 while overall manufacturing employment fell (table 2). 
 
Table 2.  Percentage Change in Employment between Business Cycle Peak Years, 
1970-2002 
 1972-1979 1979-1989 1989-2000 
All Manufacturing 9.9% -7.9% -4.7 
Component Manufacturing 24.0 -6.1 5.6 
Source: Authors’ analysis of Bureau of Labor Statistics, Quarterly Census of Employment and 
Wages, with all data converted to an approximate NAICS basis by Economy.com 
 
Prior to 1979, business cycles and changes in the US trade position had most of their 
impact on finished goods and raw materials.  But since 1979 employment in component 
manufacturing has been more sensitive to business cycles and trade than manufacturing 
as a whole.  Comparing peak and trough employment years for manufacturing as a whole, 
component employment fell by the same percentage as overall manufacturing 
employment during the 1973-75 recession but fell by a greater percentage than overall 
manufacturing employment during the 1979-83 and 1989-93 periods (both of which 
included recessions) and during 1998-2002, when a rising dollar contributed to losses of 
U.S. manufacturing jobs (table 3).  The component sector suffered greater percentage job 
losses during the latter two periods, though component employment began to recover 
earlier than overall manufacturing employment during both of those periods. 
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Table 3.  Percentage Change in Employment Between Peak and Trough 
Employment Years for All Manufacturing 
 1973-1975 1979-1983 1989-1993 1998-2002 
All Manufacturing -9.1% -12.4% -6.8% -11.1% 
Component 
Manufacturing 
-9.1 -17.4 -7.9 -13.2 
Source: Authors’ analysis of Bureau of Labor Statistics Quarterly Census of Employment and 
Wages, with all data converted to an approximate NAICS basis by Economy.com 
 
We read this to mean that, while component sector output was of course closely tied to its 
customers’ sales, starting in 1979 and accelerating sharply starting in 1998 the sector 
found itself (and not just its customers) much more exposed to global competition.   
 
Comparing Tables 2 and 3 makes clear that components’ growing share of manufacturing 
employment is tied to the sector’s better performance in the periods from cyclical troughs 
to peaks – 1975-79, 1983-89, and 1994-98.  When demand is growing briskly, large 
companies turn (perhaps because they must) to domestic component-makers. 
 
Broad Regional Trends in Employment 
 
Compared to all manufacturing, component manufacturing is much more concentrated in 
the Midwest9 and less concentrated in each of the other large regions.  In 2000, more than 
40 percent of component sector workers lived in the Midwest, while just over a quarter 
lived in the South, and less than a fifth lived in the Northeast and West, respectively 
(figure 4).  In contrast, just under a third of all manufacturing workers lived in the South, 
about 30 percent in the Midwest, nearly a fifth in the West, and less than a fifth in the 
Northeast (figure 5).  Although these data are based on workers’ residences rather than 
their places of employment, the distributions of residence and employment are similar for 
such broadly defined regions. 
 
                                                 
9 In this section, we use standard Census region definitions. 
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Figure 4.  Percent of Workers Living 
in Each Region, Component 
Manufacturing, 1988-2000
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Source: Authors’ analysis of Current Population Survey data.  Component sector employment was 
estimated using the method described in Appendix 3.  
 
Figure 5.  Percent of Workers Living in 
Each Region, All Manufacturing, 1988-
2000
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Source: Authors’ analysis of Current Population Survey data 
 
The percentage of component sector workers living in the sector’s core Midwest region 
increased from 39.5 percent in 1988 to 41.1 percent in 2000.  The share of component 
sector workers living in the South grew more dramatically, rising from 23.1 percent to 
27.2 percent.  Similar trends occurred in manufacturing as a whole, but the increase in the 
Midwest’s share of component workers was proportionally smaller than the increase in its 
share of all manufacturing workers, while the South’s gain in its share of component 
workers was proportionally larger than the increase in its share of all manufacturing 
workers.  Therefore, compared to manufacturing as a whole, component manufacturing 
became less concentrated in the Midwest and more concentrated in the South. 
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As we will see later in this paper, component manufacturing is relatively high-wage, with 
average annual earnings exceeding $45,000.  It is even higher, on average, in the 
Midwest, thanks in part to relatively high rates of sector unionization in that region 
In 2000, the Midwest was home to nearly 60 percent of all unionized component sector 
workers even though only about 40 percent of all component sector workers lived in that 
region (figure 6).   
 
Figure 6. Union (blue) & Non-Union Plants in Component Manufacturing 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: WAI analysis of proprietary AFL-CIO data on locations of unionized plants 
 
Moreover, the percentage of unionized manufacturing workers living in the Midwest rose 
between 1988 and 2000, and this increase was more rapid than the increase in the 
percentages of all component sector workers and all manufacturing workers living in the 
Midwest.  Therefore, unionized component manufacturing became more concentrated in 
the Midwest relative to both all component manufacturing and all manufacturing.  The 
percentage of unionized component sector workers also rose in the South between 1988 
and 2000; this increase was more rapid than that of manufacturing as a whole but less 
rapid than that of the component sector as a whole.  Therefore, unionized component 
manufacturing became more concentrated in the South relative to all manufacturing but 
less concentrated relative to all component manufacturing. 
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Figure 7.  Percent of Workers Living 
in Each Region, Unionized 
Component Manufacturing, 1988-2000
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Source: Authors’ analysis of Current Population Survey data 
 
 
Sleeping with the Enemy? Component Sector Firms and Their Key Customers 
 
There is a huge debate within manufacturing about why, despite the sector’s relative 
growth in the 1980s and 1990s, so many component sector firms are shrinking and/or 
unprofitable.  This debate has well-nigh split big-tent cross-sector groups like the 
National Association of Manufacturers or, at the least, created two camps, one of 
associations representing large, often multinational firms and the other of associations of 
(typically smaller) component-makers.  It is clear that many members of the latter 
increasingly view their customers as a big part of their problems: they recognize that they 
are not only losing orders, and/or opportunities to win new ones, to autonomous 
competitors in China, India, and Eastern Europe, but at least as much to offshore “firms” 
either set up, or closely directed, by their customers.  These new competitors not only 
supply those customers’ offshore plants, but also export back into the US. 
 
At the same time, global competition is also driving component suppliers to 
unprecedented levels of customer knowledge and “intimacy.”  Many component 
suppliers are being asked, and agreeing, to assume new costs and responsibilities.  In 
AMP’s major survey conducted by the Performance Benchmarking Service (PBS) for 
Case Western Reserve University in late 2003 surveyed 270 manufacturing plants with 
20-499 employees, including 186 in the states of Wisconsin, Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, and 
Michigan.10  48 percent reported that they now hold inventory that their largest customers 
                                                 
10 The Michigan Manufacturing Technology Center (MMTC) has maintained its Performance 
Benchmarking Service (PBS) database since 1993.  In the 13 years since then, it has collected detailed 
nearly 9,000 plant records.  Because many plants have participated in multiple years, the number of distinct 
plants in the database is only about 4,500.  While the dataset is not in any way a full and accurate 
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used to hold.  55 percent reported that they had needed to purchase equipment that would 
be of no value except for jobs they currently had from their single largest customer.  51 
percent reported having taken a larger role in product design than in the past. 
 
Many researchers have seen, quite correctly, potentially positive aspects of these new 
supplier roles.  They have argued, and some component suppliers agree, that customers 
are now more dependent on suppliers, and no longer view them as simply overflow 
capacity or a dumping-ground for “commodity” work.  Indeed, our survey found that 61 
percent of suppliers had gotten work from at least one of their four largest customers in 
the past three years without having to bid against competitors; 44 percent had gotten no-
bid work from their largest customer. 
 
At the same time that many suppliers are more in bed with key customers than ever 
before, they are also wary of them, and with good reason.  Component suppliers reported 
that close ties were not generally enough to keep their customers from demanding price 
cuts and actively considering moving work to lower-price competitors. 
• 56 percent reported that none of their four largest customers had ever helped them 
meet or beat a competitor’s lower bid. 
• 59 percent were not confident that their largest customer would not share 
confidential information with competitors.  As a result, no doubt, only 28 percent 
reported sharing detailed cost information with that largest customer, and just 40 
percent said they shared such information with any of their four largest customers. 
• While 51 percent stated that their largest customer “understands that we need to 
make a decent return,” 60 percent reported that their largest customer was not 
“open to counter-arguments about price reductions.”  For the 270 respondents as a 
group, the median price reduction granted was 3.7 percent, and fewer than one in 
five was able to hold the line on, or raise, prices. 
 
More optimistic scholars than we have also noted that, even as customers have asked 
more of some of their suppliers, yet also expected price cuts, they have also given things 
in return, including sole-source and/or long-term contracts and, perhaps most important, 
the time and expertise of their own engineers to help their key suppliers improve their 
performance.  Indeed, 56 percent of our respondents reported having participated in the 
supplier development program of at least one of their four largest customers; 41 percent 
said they’d done this with their largest customer.  But the data strongly suggest that most 
of this supplier development was in the area of quality, rather than in areas that support 
helping the supplier raise productivity and make money.  In brief, while 42 percent 
reported that at least one of their four largest customers had helped them improve quality, 
                                                                                                                                                 
representation of US manufacturing – e.g., it oversamples mechanical components, the Upper Midwest 
region, and small and medium-sized plants – it yields percentile cutpoints (10th, 25th, median, 75th, 90th) that 
closely match the Census of Manufactures’ cutpoints on shared metrics, including labor productivity 
(value-added per employee) and inventory turnover.  These same caveats about the PBS dataset should be 
borne in mind when we use it later in this paper to discuss the erosion in the union pay premium. 
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only 22 percent said they’d helped with inventory reduction and just 16 percent with 
setup-time reduction.11
 
While many component suppliers remain hopeful that they will continue to be valued by 
their key customers, they clearly sense that many of their customers are increasingly 
buying on price and becoming decreasingly loyal to onshore, and home-region, 
production. 
• 86 percent reported that at least one of their four largest customers had moved 
work that traditionally belonged to the supplier to competitors because of price; 
79 percent said their largest customer had done this. 
• Many reported customers moving that traditional work to low-wage countries: 
Mexico, 44 percent; Asia, 39 percent; and Eastern Europe 17 percent.  Much of 
this is explained, no doubt, by the fact that the customers themselves are moving 
out to these locations.  36 percent of our respondents reported that their largest 
customer was moving capacity to Asia, 23 percent to Mexico, and 20 percent to 
Eastern Europe.  Only 14 percent reported having been asked to move with their 
largest customer, and only 23 percent with any of their four largest customers.  
(We suspect that an update to 2005 would show big jumps in most of the numbers 
in this bullet point.) 
 
Thus, while “globalization” is a very real threat to onshore component-makers, for now 
relatively few of them are moving offshore. Most think that they will still get some work 
for their customers, at least from the customers’ locations that are not moved south and 
offshore.  64 percent say that their proximity to key customers counts for something with 
those customers.  But with customer behavior in pricing, sourcing, and location clearly 
perceived as a challenge, many suppliers report believing that, within 20 if not just ten 
years, they will either have to close or move.  78 percent reported being “very confident” 
they’d still be in business “at this location” in three years.  Looking out 10 years, only 48 
percent were confident they’d still be where they are (or anywhere).  Twenty years out, 
just 23 percent were very confident of staying put.   
 
In short, not only are most component suppliers feeling somewhat abused by their 
customers, they see those customers as less and less supplier-, region-, and US-loyal.  
Many suppliers apparently see themselves nearing a tipping-point moment on the 
question of staying where they are.  Happily, most cite ties to nearby customers and 
suppliers, obligations to their current workforce, the owner’s ties to the community, and 
their large sunk investment as binding them to staying put.  Not surprisingly, the first of 
these – ties to customers – is the weakest, with 35 percent saying it plays little or no role 
in keeping them where they are.  Still, the fact that 65 percent still credit those ties with 
helping hold them where they makes a hopeful point: there are some customers that will 
stay and fight and that, with the right policy and political supports, may be induced to 
                                                 
11 This is a perplexing finding, since customers presumably stand to gain more in the way of lower quotes 
from leanness than from improved quality.  Our educated guess is that the generalization of lean has 
coincided with a continuing erosion in customers’ activism in helping their suppliers.  Increasingly, 
customers’ attitude is that “I can get parts anywhere in the world.  It’s your job – not mine -- to make your 
parts the ones I prefer to buy.” 
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make common cause with their suppliers, who overwhelmingly want to stay where they 
are. 
 
Faced with pricing pressure and new and costly demands, yet generally committed to 
staying where they are, suppliers are following a variety of strategies.  Many reported 
continuing to invest in their workers (46 percent), facilities (38 percent), and equipment 
(48 percent).  A comfortingly low nine percent reported a strong inclination to “move to 
recipes requiring many fewer skilled workers,” but another 55 percent would not rule it 
out.  Even more comforting, just nine percent anticipated moving work to low-wage 
regions, and only another 21 percent would not rule it out.  Clearly, most component 
suppliers want to “stay and fight,” even if their customers are making their lives 
miserable.  A heartening 44 percent reported having refused to lower prices to at least one 
of their four largest customers, and 23 percent reported refusing to quote work to at least 
one.  52 percent said they had “fired” a customer in the past two years.  In a nutshell, 
some are fighting.  But the terms of the fight will have a lot to do with the recipes – and 
hence the wages, conditions, and productivity – they employ. 
 
There is little reason to think that most of the respondents’ customers are likely to 
become more, rather than less, loyal to their in-region suppliers – unless they have 
significant incentives to do so.  As we will see, there are revenue-neutral state policies 
that hold reasonable promise to provide such incentives.  As we’ll also see, implementing 
such policies not state-by-state but on a regional basis will be much more efficient and 
effective. 
 
Wages in Components and in Manufacturing As a Whole 
 
Since at least the late 1970s component sector workers’ average annual wage has 
exceeded that of all manufacturing workers (figure 8).12  In 2002, component sector 
workers were paid an average of $45,419 per year (in 2002 dollars), 0.5 percent higher 
than the all-manufacturing average of $45,174 per year.  However, the component 
sector’s average-wage advantage over manufacturing as a whole eroded substantially 
between since 1978, when component sector workers earned an average of 7.3 percent 
more per year than manufacturing workers as a whole.  The erosion occurred because the 
real average wage rose more slowly in components than in manufacturing as a whole.  
From 1978-2002 the component sector’s real average annual wage increased by 21.1 
percent while the real average annual wage in manufacturing as a whole grew by 27.7 
percent. 
                                                 
12 These data may be confusing to some readers accustomed to thinking of component suppliers as small, 
usually non-union plants, relative to other, larger non-component firms more likely to be unionized.  What 
is really at play here is the different subsectoral composition of the two groups.  Non-component 
manufacturers include many low-wage nondurable manufacturers (e.g., apparel-makers), as well as durable 
goods-making GM and Caterpillar plants.  Component suppliers include tool and die shops paying workers 
$25-30 an hour as well as low-wage wiring harness-makers. 
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Figure 8.  Average Annual Wage,     1978-
2002 (2002 Dollars)
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Source: Authors’ analysis of Bureau of Labor Statistics, Quarterly Census of Employment and 
Wages, with all data converted to an approximate NAICS basis by Economy.com 
 
An examination of median hourly wages tells a somewhat different story (figure 9).  
Component sector workers had a higher median hourly wage than all manufacturing 
workers throughout the 1988-2000 period.  In 2000, component sector workers’ median 
wage was $14.61 (in 2002 dollars), 6.9 percent higher than the $13.67 median hourly 
wage of all manufacturing workers.13  But component sector workers’ median hourly 
wage, unlike their average annual wage, neither rose in absolute terms nor fell relative to 
that of all manufacturing workers during this period.  Instead, there was no trend in 
component workers’ absolute or relative median hourly wage.  The component sector 
median wage generally fell from 1988-1996, rose substantially from 1997-99, and then 
fell again somewhat from 1999-2000, leaving component workers as well off in 2000 as 
in 1988.  Relative to the median wage in all manufacturing the component sector median 
wage rose from 1988-92, fell from 1993-97, rose from 1998-99, and fell in 2000, leaving 
component sector workers in about the same relative position in 2000 as in 1988.14   
                                                 
13 Component sector workers also has a higher median hourly wage than all durable manufacturing 
workers throughout the 1988-2000 period, although their wage advantage over all durable manufacturing 
workers was smaller than their wage advantage over all manufacturing workers.  Component sector 
workers' 2000 median wage was 1.5 percent higher than the $14.39 median hourly wage of all durable 
manufacturing workers. 
 
14 The differences between the median hourly and average annual wage results could be the result of 
several factors: changes in work hours in components and all manufacturing, changes in wages among 
high-wage workers within individual industries within components and within all manufacturing, changes 
in the industrial composition of employment within components and within all manufacturing, sampling 
and non-sampling error in the Current Population Survey (the source of the data from which median wages 
were estimated), and error in identifying the component sector in the Current Population Survey. 
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Figure 9.  Median Hourly Wage, 1988-2000 
(2002 dollars)
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Source: Authors’ analysis of Current Population Survey data 
 
Productivity in Components and in Manufacturing As a Whole 
 
Since at least the late 1980s, productivity growth in component manufacturing has lagged 
behind that of other manufacturing.  From 1987-2000, 23 separate SIC component 
industries had slower productivity growth (as measured by the Bureau of Labor Statistics) 
than the three-digit SIC industries of which they were a part, while only 15 had faster 
productivity growth. (table 4).15  Thirty-three of the component sector industries had 
slower productivity growth than manufacturing as a whole, while 12 had faster 
productivity growth.  The contrast with durable manufacturing, manufacturing’s 
productivity leader during this period, is even more striking.  Thirty-nine component 
sector industries had slower productivity growth than durable manufacturing as a whole, 
while only six had faster productivity growth.  The aggregate component sector also had 
much slower productivity growth (43.7 percent) during this period than all manufacturing 
(52.8 percent) and all durable manufacturing (70.5 percent). 
 
                                                 
15 Seven component industries were identical to three-digit SIC industries, so this comparison is not 
applicable to them. 
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Table 4.  Percentage Change in Productivity in Components, 1987-2000 
SIC Industry Percentage change in productivity, 1987-
2000 
3679 Electronic components, n.e.c. 195.0 
3671 Electron tubes 188.7 
3493 Steel springs, except wire 140.6 
3675 Electronic capacitors 92.1 
3594 Fluid power pumps and motors 91.7 
3672 Printed circuit boards 72.9 
 AGGREGATE DURABLE GOODS MFG 70.5 
3519 Internal combustion engines, n.e.c. 66.2 
345 Screw machine products, bolts, etc. 59.8 
362 Electrical industrial apparatus  57.0 
3593 Fluid power cylinders and actuators  54.7 
3691 Storage batteries 53.9 
 AGGREGATE MANUFACTURING  52.8 
3061 Mechanical rubber goods 52.8 
3592 Carburetors, pistons, rings, and valves 52.4 
3089 Plastics products, n.e.c.  51.9 
3613 Switchgear and switchboard apparatus 49.2 
3714 Motor vehicle parts and accessories 46.9 
301 Tires and inner tubes 45.9 
 AGGREGATE COMPONENT SECTOR 43.7 
3545 Machine tool accessories 43.6 
3491  Industrial valves 39.1 
3599 Industrial machinery, n.e.c.   37.8 
3317 Steel pipe and tubes 35.7 
3495 Wire springs  35.5 
3315 Steel wire and related products 34.3 
3492 Fluid power valves and hose fittings 34.1 
3084 Plastics pipe  33.3 
332 Iron and steel foundries 32.1 
3544 Special dies, tools, jigs, and fixtures  30.3 
346 Metal forgings and stampings  29.8 
336 Nonferrous foundries (castings) 29.7 
3543 Industrial patterns 25.2 
3677 Electronic coils and transformers  24.6 
3647 Vehicular lighting equipment 19.2 
3498 Fabricated pipe and fittings 18.0 
3728 Aircraft parts and equipment, n.e.c. 17.5 
305 Hose and belting and gaskets and packing  15.4 
3676 Electronic resistors 14.4 
3562 Ball and roller bearings 11.2 
3566 Speed changers, drives, and gears 10.3 
3769 Space vehicle equipment, n.e.c. 9.7 
3443 Fabricated plate work (boiler shops) 7.4 
3724 Aircraft engines and engine parts 3.9 
3764 Space propulsion units and parts -7.0 
3494 Valves and pipe fittings, n.e.c.  -17.9 
3499 Fabricated metal products, n.e.c.  -25.7 
3678 Electronic connectors -30.7 
Source: Authors’ analysis of published and unpublished Bureau of Labor Statistics data 
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It is important not to be impressed with some of the large figures in table 4: remember 
that, thanks to compounding, three percent annual productivity growth comes to 47 
percent in the 13-year period.  Thus only 15 of the 45 subsectors beat that 3 percent-per-
year benchmark, and six of those 15 were electrical/electronic (as opposed to mechanical) 
components.  The 43.7 percent figure for the sector as a whole is only 2.8 percent per 
year.  For the 1997-2003 period, annual productivity growth was even lower for many 
component sectors.16
 
In a traded-goods world in which some competitors enjoy a 15, 20, or even 30 percent 
landed cost advantage vis-à-vis onshore producers, for many firms a qualitative leap – 
on the order of 3-5 years of 7-10 percent productivity gain, will be required.  
Because many offshore plants are not standing still either, the true requirement may be on 
the order of 10-15 percent per year.  Performance Benchmarking Service data show that 
something like one in seven US firms achieves 10 percent-plus annual gains in any given 
two year period.  As we will see, however, for a region to be world-competitive it will 
have to find effective ways to have a larger proportion of the manufacturers within its 
borders make this leap.  And because not all firms can (or even want) to do so, states and 
regions will have to focus their resources on the minority of firms that are willing and 
capable, and whose success promises the highest return on the public investment.  Most 
such firms are high-wage and many, albeit it a shrinking minority, are unionized.  
 
Union Density and Presence 
 
Since 1988, union density has been higher in component manufacturing than in  
manufacturing as a whole (figure 10).  In 2000, unions represented 21 percent of 
component sector workers, but only 15.7 percent of all manufacturing workers.  
However, union density in both components and all manufacturing fell from 1988-2000.  
The relative decline was smaller in components (where union density was 29.9 percent in 
1988) than in all manufacturing (where union density was 23.9 percent in 1988).  
Moreover, component sector union density appears to have stabilized from 1998-2000, 
while union density in manufacturing as a whole continued to fall. 
 
The better relative survival of unions in components should be intuitive.  Component 
manufacturing is typically higher-skill than final-goods production.  While kitting, 
“screwdriver,” and other assembly operations are strewn across the globe – with 
companies often favoring greenfield sites away from large labor markets, on a regional 
and national basis component manufacturing remains more metropolitan and more 
spatially concentrated.  These are also the locations in which manufacturing-sector unions 
historically have thrived (or, lately, shrunk the least). 
 
                                                 
16 See “US Factories: Falling Behind,” Business Week, May 24, 2004, pp. 94-96. 
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Figure 10.  Union Density, 1988-2000
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Source: Authors’ analysis of Current Population Survey data 
 
Of the approximately 54,262 business establishments in the component sector, about 
3,862 (or 7.1 percent) have some unionized employees.17  Because the percentage of 
component sector establishments with a union presence is much smaller than the 
percentage of component sector workers represented by unions, unionized establishments 
in this sector must be much larger on average than nonunion establishments. 
 
The twelve unions that represent the largest number of component manufacturing plants 
are the United Automobile Workers; International Association of Machinists; United 
Steel Workers of America; International Brotherhood of Teamsters; Glass Molders and 
Pottery Workers; Communications Workers of America; International Brotherhood of 
Electrical Workers; Paper, Allied-Industrial, Chemical, and Energy Workers; 
International Brotherhood of Boilermakers; United Food and Commercial Workers; 
UNITE HERE (the union that formed when the Union of Needletrades, Industrial and 
Textile Employees and the Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees International 
Union merged in 2004); and the Novelty Production Workers.  One or more unions may 
be present in a single establishment, as different unions may represent different groups of 
workers in the establishment.   
 
Regional Patterns of Union Density and Presence 
 
Union density in components is highest in Midwest (where unions represented 29.7 
percent of all component sector workers in 2000), then in the Northeast (20.7 percent), 
and is much lower in the South (14.8 percent) and West (9.4 percent).  Union density 
declined in all regions from 1988-1998 (figure 11).  From 1998-2000, it stabilized in the 
Midwest and Northeast, rose in the South, and continued to fall in the West.  During the 
entire period 1988-2000, the relative decline in union density was smallest in the 
Midwest (where density declined by about a quarter), then in the Northeast (where it fell 
                                                 
17 This estimate was derived from proprietary AFL-CIO data. 
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by about 29 percent) and South (31 percent drop), and greatest in the West (where density 
fell by more than half). 
Figure 11.  Component Sector Union Density by Region,
1988-2000
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Source: Authors’ analysis of Current Population Survey data 
 
Unionized component sector plants are heavily concentrated in the urban areas on or near 
the Great Lakes and between Boston and Philadelphia, with smaller concentrations in 
major West Coast cities, and some presence in the South Central portion of the country 
(see figure 6).  Nonunion component plants are much more evenly spread throughout the 
nation, though the major centers of unionized component manufacturing are also major 
centers of nonunion component manufacturing.  However, there are also important 
concentrations of nonunion plants in the Carolinas, the Atlanta area, the major 
metropolitan areas of Texas, and Tennessee.  Within the core component manufacturing 
areas of the Midwest, Northeast, and upper South, unionized plants are generally located 
closer to the centers of major metropolitan areas than are nonunion plants. 
 
Union-Nonunion Wage Differentials in Component Manufacturing: Evidence from the 
Current Population Survey (CPS) 
 
In 1988, component sector workers’ median hourly wage was $16.36, while in 2000 it 
was $15.77.  Nonunion workers’ median wage was $13.73 in 1988 and $14.06 in 2000.  
(All wages are expressed in constant 2002 dollars.)  Wages for both union and nonunion 
workers generally fell from 1988-94 and rose after that (except in 2000, when both union 
and nonunion wages fell) (figure 12). 
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Figure 12.  Component Sector Union and Nonunion 
Median Hourly Wages, 1988-2000 (in 2002 dollars)
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Source: Authors’ analysis of Current Population Survey data 
 
Unionized component sector workers earn more than their nonunion counterparts.  In 
2000 the median wage of unionized workers in the sector was 12.2 percent higher than 
that of nonunion component sector workers.  The differential between the union and 
nonunion median wages in component manufacturing displayed a modest upward trend 
during the early 1990s but fell from 1996-2000, with especially large drops in 1997 and 
1998 (figure 13).  Over the entire period 1988-2000, union workers’ wage premium 
eroded substantially.  The 12.2 percent union-nonunion median wage differential in 2000 
was well below 1988’s differential of 19.2 percent. 
 
Figure 13.  Component Sector Union Wage 
Premium, 1988-2000
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Source: Authors’ analysis of Current Population Survey data 
 
Union and nonunion workers differ in a variety of ways, apart from union status, that 
may affect their wages.  Regression analysis was used to isolate the effect of union status 
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on component sector workers’ average wages.18  The results of the analysis show broad 
trends similar to those reported above for the union-nonunion median wage differential.  
The regression-based union-nonunion wage differential trended upward from 1989-1995, 
then fell substantially from 1996-1999.  Because of a large jump in the regression-
adjusted union-nonunion differential in 2000, the differential was actually higher in 2000 
(when it was 16.2 percent) than in 1989 (when it was 15.7 percent).  But if the year 2000 
is excluded, then the regression-adjusted differential fell substantially since 1989 (to 14.2 
percent in 1999).  Thus, the regression analysis generally supports the main findings from 
the comparison of unadjusted median hourly wages: (1) the union wage premium in 
component manufacturing generally fell from the late 1980s through the end of the 
1990s, (2) there was a slight upward trend in the union wage premium from the late 
1980s through the mid-1990s, and (3) there was a dramatic fall in the union wage 
premium in the late 1990s though, as we will see, this was significantly offset by a 
growing “premium” in health insurance coverage. 
 
The Employment-Wage-Productivity Connection 
 
If the unionized component sector is to grow (or even stabilize), and if the size of its 
wage premium over the nonunion sector is to be restored, then its productivity growth 
rate must rise.  Rapid productivity growth does not ensure wage and job growth, 
especially not in the short term.  But rapid, sustainable long-term growth in wages and 
employment cannot occur without it.  Wage growth can, of course, occur because of a 
redistribution of value-added from profits to wages, but even if pattern bargaining can be 
reconstructed in the component sector such a redistribution cannot continue indefinitely.  
And competition from the nonunion component sector, both domestically and in low-
wage countries, prevents the unionized component sector from growing as long as the 
unionized component sector’s unit labor costs (the ratio of its labor costs to its 
productivity) are at or above those of the nonunion sector.  (The PBS evidence presented 
above suggests that unit labor costs are now similar in the unionized and nonunion 
component sectors in the U.S. once the cost of employer-provided health insurance is 
taken into account.) 
 
 Some union members may fear that more rapid productivity growth will lead only to 
more rapid job loss.  An analysis of the relationship between productivity growth and job 
growth in the post-World War II period has shown that, although the U.S. manufacturing 
industries with the fastest productivity growth once had the fastest job growth (as 
productivity growth led to the expansion of product markets and, hence, of domestic 
jobs), in more recent years the manufacturing industries with the most rapid productivity 
growth had the most rapid job losses (as the job-expanding growth of product markets 
                                                 
18 For each year from 1989-2000, the natural logarithm of the hourly wage was regressed on age, age 
squared, race, sex, education, marital status, region, metropolitan, broad occupation, and union 
representation, using data on individual component sector workers from the merged outgoing rotation 
groups of the Current Population Survey.  The component sector was imputed using the method described 
in Appendix 3.  The union-nonunion wage differential, d, for each year was derived from that year’s 
estimated coefficient on union representation, c, using the approximation d=ec-1. 
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failed to make up for the labor-saving effects of productivity growth).19  Moreover, as 
figures 14 and 15 show, U.S. manufacturing as a whole experienced rapid productivity 
growth from 1987-2000, but during the 1990s it lost jobs and its wage growth failed to 
keep pace with its productivity growth.    
 
Figure 14.  Employment, Wages, and Productivity in All 
U.S. Manufacturing, 1987-2000
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Source: Authors’ analysis of Bureau of Labor Statistics Quarterly Census of Employment and 
Wages, with all data converted to an approximate NAICS basis by Economy.com, and authors’ 
analysis of published Bureau of Labor Statistics productivity data 
 
Figure 15.  Annual Percent Change in Employment, Wages, 
and Productivity in All U.S. Manufacturing, 1988-2000
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Source: Authors’ analysis of Bureau of Labor Statistics Quarterly Census of Employment and 
Wages, with all data converted to an approximate NAICS basis by Economy.com, and authors’ 
analysis of published Bureau of Labor Statistics productivity data 
 
But the component sector’s productivity, job, and wage performance during the 
same period gives some cause for optimism.  Despite a drop in employment during the 
                                                 
19 Eileen Appelbaum and Ronald Schettkat, “Employment and Productivity in Industrialized Economies,” 
International Labour Review, vol.134 (1995), pp. 605-623. 
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recession and jobless recovery of the early 1990s, the component sector gained jobs 
during the entire 1987-2000 period even as its productivity rose, and its wage growth fell 
short of its productivity growth by less than was the case in manufacturing as a whole 
(figures 16 and 17).  
 
Figure 16.  Employment, Wage, and Productivity in 
Component Manufacturing, 1987-2000
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Source: Authors’ analysis of Bureau of Labor Statistics Quarterly Census of Employment and 
Wages, with all data converted to an approximate NAICS basis by Economy.com, and authors’ 
analysis of published Bureau of Labor Statistics productivity data 
 
Figure 17. Annual Percent Change in Employment, Wages, 
and Productivity in Component Manufacturing, 1988-2000
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Source: Authors’ analysis of Bureau of Labor Statistics Quarterly Census of Employment and 
Wages, with all data converted to an approximate NAICS basis by Economy.com, and authors’ 
analysis of published Bureau of Labor Statistics productivity data 
 
Even so, the most relevant comparison for purposes of union (and public) policy is not 
the comparison between recent years and the past; nor is it the comparison among 
productivity growth, wage growth, and job losses during the 1990s.  Rather, the issue is 
the gap between what will happen to the unionized component sector in the future if 
productivity continues to grow slowly and what will happen if productivity starts to grow 
more rapidly.  Because rapid growth of union jobs and a restoration of the union wage 
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premium cannot be sustained in components without more rapid productivity growth, an 
increase in productivity growth would be necessary even if the short-term future 
relationships among productivity, employment, and wages in components were to 
resemble those of manufacturing as a whole rather than those of the component sector in 
the recent past.  In short, without sharp and sustained productivity growth, there is no 
way forward for unions.  That is why we have concluded that there is no alternative to 
getting lean; the only debate is how and on what terms. 
 
The Disappearing Union Advantage: PBS Data 
 
In both wages and productivity, unionized firms have historically outperformed their non-
union counterparts.  But publicly available data do not shed much light on the forces 
behind the relative performance of unions and nonunion facilities.  Fortunately, the PBS 
dataset is dominated by component manufacturers.  Although PBS is much smaller and 
less nationally representative than the CPS, it does not require the definition of the 
component sector to be imputed and it contains a wealth of detailed information about 
establishment characteristics. Appendices 4-5 provide details on the statistical analyses 
we performed using PBS data. 
 
As recently as 1997-98, PBS participants exhibited a significant compensation gap 
between union and non-union plants. Union shops averaged $13.11 per hour -- fully 
$1.69 more per hour than the $11.42 paid by non-union shops -- representing a wage 
premium of nearly 15 percent. 
 
Further, this wage gap was accompanied by a productivity and performance gap. Among 
PBS participants, union shops averaged 12.7 percent higher labor productivity (value-
added per FTE of $72,600 versus $64,400 for non-union shops); provided 46.6 percent 
more capital equipment to their employees ($56,900 worth of equipment per worker 
versus $38,800); and achieved 30 percent lower employee turnover (22.7 percent annual 
turnover versus 32.3 percent). Union shops in the PBS sample also tended to be larger 
(averaging 213 employees, versus 108), and sold a higher proportion of their output to 
customers in the automotive industry (49.5 percent versus 34.0 percent).  
 
By 2002-03, however, the union shops no longer paid significantly more than their non-
union counterparts. The union average wage had risen by just over $1 per hour, to 
$14.17. But the non-union average had risen by $2.35, to $13.77 per hour. The gap had 
thus shrunk to only $0.40 per hour, and was no longer statistically significant.20
                                                 
20 These findings hold under a variety of analytical techniques. The gaps reported here (and in Appendix 2) 
come from analysis of variance (ANOVA) of all PBS participants in 1997-98, and all participants in 2002-
03. These are not identical samples, which raises the question of whether the disappearing union wage gap 
could be the result of changes in the groups of participants. Thus we replicated the analysis for just those 
plants that were PBS participants in both periods. Results were essentially identical, with a strong wage gap 
in 1997-98 and no wage gap in 2002-03.  
 
An important limitation of the ANOVA approach is that it considers only one variable at a time. Thus we 
also performed regression analysis, to allow us to look at several factors that determine wages – such as 
industry mix, capital intensity, productivity, etc. – as well as unionization. Results were that even when 
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Perhaps even more important, non-union shops had virtually closed the labor 
productivity gap.  Value-added per FTE among union shops now averaged $75,000, or an 
increase of 3.3 percent since 1998-99. But among non-union shops, value-added per FTE 
rose by 12.7 percent, to $69,400. The resulting productivity differential of $5,400 was no 
longer statistically significant. Average equipment value per worker at non-union shops 
had increased by 52 percent to $59,100 – slightly exceeding the union average of 
$58,700. Further, while employee turnover rates increased for both groups, the turnover 
differential also lost statistical significance. 
 
PBS data do indicate the existence of a “health coverage gap” between union and non-
union components plants, and this gap persists. Specifically, for PBS 1997-98, an average 
of 88 percent of shop floor employees in union plants were covered by substantially-
employer-paid health benefits, versus only 71 percent of shop floor employees in non-
union plants. The coverage gap was thus 16 percentage points. In 2002-03, coverage for 
both groups fell slightly, to 84 percent for union shops and 69 percent for non-union 
shops, implying a gap of 15 percentage points. These union/non-union differences were 
statistically significant in both years. Published data indicate that the value of these 
benefits to workers added roughly $.30-$.90 to the hourly wage gap for 1997-98, and 
between $.45-$1.15 to the wage gap for 2002-03.21
 
The strong probability that, among small and medium-sized US component 
manufacturers, the union productivity and pay premium has substantially eroded – and 
the fact that it has done so even though the vast majority of (mainly non-union) 
component-makers have not achieved robust annual productivity growth rates – suggests 
a clear imperative.  For component sector firms and the unions representing workers in 
some of those firms, effective and rapid productivity boosts are necessary to a continued 
onshore presence at family-supporting wage levels.  We turn now to 17 detailed case 
studies of how component firms, some unionized and some not, are adjusting to the new 
competitive realities.  As we have already stated, “getting leaner” is a ticket to play.  Not 
                                                                                                                                                 
controlling for these other factors, the union effect among PBS participants was strong at $.92/hr in 1997-
98 (and highly statistically significant), falling to only $.18/hr in 2002-03 (and not significant). These 
results also appear in Appendices 4-5. 
 
21 Data on the costs of employer-provided health coverage come from two sources. The first is the Mercer 
National Survey of Employer-Sponsored Health Plans. It indicates that the average cost per insured 
employee was roughly $3800 in 1997-98, rising to $6000 for 2002-03. Applying these average costs to 
PBS data on coverage rates (in 1997-98, 88% union and 71% non-union; in 2002-03, 84% union and 69% 
non-union), and assuming 2000 working hours per year, implies a “hourly equivalent health insurance gap” 
of $.32/hr in 1997-98, rising to $.45/hr in 2002-03.  
 
The second source is the BLS series on Employer Costs for Employee Compensation. BLS reports that 
Total Insurance (not just health insurance, but also FICA, unemployment insurance, and life insurance) cost 
an average of $2.21/hr among unionized manufacturing plants in 1997-98, rising to $2.98/hr in 2002-03. 
(Note that BLS figures include total insurance costs per all hours worked by all employees – that is, per 
hour costs represent an average for all workers, not just covered workers.) Among non-union shops, the 
cost was $1.31/hr in 1997-98, rising to $1.72/hr in 2002-03. BLS data also indicate that health insurance 
costs fairly consistently represent roughly 90% of total insurance costs. Thus the average health insurance 
gap based on BLS data was $.83 per hour in 1997-98, rising to $1.15 per hour in 2002-03. 
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all companies are doing this, and many that are trying to do so are doing it in ways that 
are not likely to be effective or sustainable.  The approaches that work best have, we 
believe, important implications for human resource management and for the programs of 
labor unions at the local, regional, and international levels. 
 
Case Studies on Work Organization and Plant Performance 
 
A High-Performance Work Organization model 
 
Many US component manufacturers cannot compete on cost alone. No amount of 
regulatory “reform” to reduce structural costs and “level the playing field” will make 
most US suppliers price-competitive with suppliers in hyper-low-wage regions.22 What 
better US suppliers must do instead is turn their higher wage costs into a competitive 
advantage by pursuing our FULL approach , which combines low-waste manufacturing 
practices (“lean”) with an involved, empowered, and prepared workforce focused on 
innovativeness and organizational flexibility (“learning”)23  As we have noted, learning 
lean firms must be able to count on staying reasonably busy: without full utilization, their 
fixed costs will result in severe competitive penalties.  Indeed, high-wage firms tend to be 
more capital-intensive than their colleagues and competitors, making high utilization of 
capacity even more important for them. 
 
We strongly believe that the FULL approach can produce benefits for firms as well as 
workers. Using the Performance Benchmarking Service’s dataset (about which more 
later), we have tried to predict which manufacturers are most profitable.24 Controlling for 
industry sector, we have found that labor productivity is predicted by a firm being both 
fully utilized (measured as the proportion of the hours in a year that machines are 
running) and lean (imperfectly measured as inventory turns).  With the same control 
variables, we found that only being highly utilized predicts pre-tax profitability. We 
interpret these results to mean that being lean has become a ticket to play for companies 
that require high productivity if they are to afford to pay good wages and benefits, but 
that firms must be running at or near full capacity to make money.  For the substantial 
proportion of companies that are neither lean nor fully utilized, we believe, getting lean is 
                                                 
22 Cost reduction and leveling the playing field are two key planks in NAM’s “Campaign for Growth and 
Manufacturing Renewal” (http://www.nam.org/s_nam/sec.asp?CID=229&DID=227). For many products, a 
25-30% drop in the dollar or a 15-25% increase in productivity would be required to make most US 
components-makers cost-competitive on a piece-price basis. The other two NAM planks are to “promote 
innovation, investment and productivity,” and “ensure an adequate supply of skilled workers.” While we 
agree in principle with these latter two emphases, we see them as indirect. The core strategy, we believe, 
must focus on directly upgrading manufacturing capability and performance at the firm level and will, we 
show, work best if performed on a regional basis.   
23 Note that we are not saying that these firms will need to abandon high-volume, repetitive, “routine” parts 
and products to “China.”  In real-world manufacturing, most firms do a mix of hard-to-make, “distinctive” 
work along with some “routine” work.  Economists’ consensus -- argued perhaps most cogently in Robert 
Reich’s work in the 1970s and 1980s – to the contrary, the composition of US manufactured imports (cars, 
machine tools, plasma screens) does not look a whit more routine than our largest exports (chemicals, paper 
and pulp, and – to be fair – Boeing aircraft and Caterpillar construction equipment).   
24 Regression results are presented in Appendix 2. 
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an essential means to harvest resources now being wasted to invest in acquiring enough 
new business to increase utilization.   
  
High productivity allows manufacturers to pay higher wages, in addition to reducing 
costs by doing more with less, while innovativeness and flexibility lead to growth in 
market share as firms are able to satisfy OEM customer’s demands for suppliers that 
provide solutions, not just parts.  But no matter how fast and flexible firms become, 
unless they can “level” production at a high level, high fixed costs will render them 
uncompetitive.  As we will show, new regional policies have a critical role to play in 
reserving demand for in-region firms seeking to follow the new recipe. 
 
Before turning to the role of regional policy, we want to focus closely on what is known 
about how manufacturing companies reach qualitatively higher performance. There is 
broad agreement in the academic literature that firm performance is most dramatically 
improved when a package of complementary manufacturing and HR practices is 
implemented – that is, when certain manufacturing and/or HR practices are implemented 
together as a system, rather than in isolation.27 In terms of manufacturing practices, we 
are convinced by our reading of the academic literature and our work in the field with 
manufacturers that lean production techniques can provide substantial performance 
improvements in terms of reduced waste and increased flexibility and productivity. It is 
possible, however, for manufacturers to focus on the technical elements of lean 
production and see significant performance improvements without modifying HR 
practices and workplace ‘culture’ to encourage high levels of involvement from workers. 
While firms can see significant improvements in productivity by implementing lean 
production in this partial and limited way, we believe that higher-wage firms can achieve 
world-class performance only if they also properly implement high-involvement HR 
practices and focus on cultural change, where the latter includes transforming conceptual 
frameworks, social relations and routines that may have developed into more-or-less rigid 
patterns through historical repetition.  
 
                                                 
25 Regression results are presented in Appendix 2. 
26 We are aware that there is a large literature about firms, particularly in Europe, succeeding by being 
specialized and agile at redefining slices, or niches, of markets and serving those niches through craft 
production.  While that works for some companies, the vast majority of the traded-goods economy is made 
up of products produced at substantial scale on a repetitive basis.  Even for “high-end” craft-oriented shops, 
high machine utilization increasingly requires that they take on at least some “commodity” work to keep 
their capital equipment highly deployed. 
27 Peter Cappelli, Laurie Bassi, Harry Katz, David Knoke, Paul Osterman, and Michael Useem, Change at 
Work, Oxford, Oxford University Press (1997); Casey Ichniowski, Thomas A. Kochan, David Levine, 
Craig Olson, and Goerge Strauss “What Works at Work: Overview and Assessment,” Industrial Relations 
35 (1996); Jeffrey Kling, “High-performance Work Systems and Firm Performance,” Monthly Labor 
Review May (1995); David I. Levine and Laura D’Andrea Tyson “Participation, Productivity, and the 
Firm's Environment,” in A. S. Blinder (ed.) Paying for Productivity: A Look at the Evidence, Washington, 
D.C., Brookings Institution (1990). John Paul MacDuffie, “Human Resource Bundles and Manufacturing 
Performance: Organizational Logic and Flexible Production Systems in the World Auto Industry,” 
Industrial and Labor Relations Review 48 (1995). One article that does not find evidence supporting the 
complementarities or synergies hypothesis is Peter Cappelli and David Neumark, “Do ‘High-Performance’ 
Work Practices Improve Establishment-Level Outcomes,” Industrial and Labor Relations Review 54, 4 
(2001).  
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Lean efforts focus on the reduction of buffers and the reorganization of the factory to 
improve product flow, product quality and overall process operation. In addition to 
making the system more fragile and vulnerable to breakdown, the environment of lean 
production is much more demanding in general. While managers can obtain some of the 
benefits of lean production without engaging workers in substantive participation in 
problem solving and decision-making, a lean system will really only hum if it is driven 
by engaged workers. We distinguish a high-involvement, “learning” model of lean – 
sometimes called (in our view, confusing “recipe” with outcome) “high-performance 
work organization” (HPWO) -- from what we call the lean standardization model. The 
latter focuses largely on inventory reduction and process standardization and 
improvement without substantive worker participation. While workers may be consulted 
and some continuous improvement achieved, we find much efforts at lean standardization 
without much change in terms of HR practices or workplace culture.  
 
We think that the learning/HPWO model generates better manufacturing performance 
than the lean standardization model, for three reasons. First, continuous innovation is 
needed because plants face an unending task of handling more variety and falling average 
order sizes as they try to stay busy in an environment in which the highest-volume orders 
are the most likely to be competed away. Second, routine high self-management is 
needed, because high-pay lean shops cannot afford to carry as much overhead. Third, and 
perhaps most important, if “continuous improvement” of manufacturing processes is 
really to be continuous – for instance, when process maps are changed at regular 
intervals, rather than as a one-off effort – such restructuring will be best guided and 
driven by those who have both the tacit, expert knowledge and the practical, experiential 
knowledge that only direct workers have. The model we articulate utilizes a high-
involvement, high-skill labor force engaged in continuous improvement of (lean) 
manufacturing techniques to reduce waste and improve process control in the context of 
strong demand. 
 
Our learning/HPWO model shares with the lean standardization model a core focus on 
improved flow through repeatable processes via a transformation of the organization of 
production from a functional layout based on batching and queuing to a product-focused 
layout based on continuous flow principles. Traditional mass production is based on 
forecasted demand; work is scheduled at individual work stations and pushed through the 
shop. The result is a disjointed system with cost drivers hidden by the buffers of large 
work in process (WIP) inventories, an army of indirect labor, and long lead times. Using 
lean techniques, in contrast, parts with similar processes and routines are mapped into 
families so that the shop layout can be reorganized into product-focused cells (work 
areas) and lines that are scheduled at a single point in a continuous-flow sequence, based 
on customer demand. Work is pulled through the factory with operations connected into 
continuous flow and production and inventory control based on visual signals (kanbans), 
so that queue time, WIP, machine setups, inventory turns and, ultimately, product costs 
and lead times are reduced to a minimum.28     
                                                 
28 Note that pulling product through the process need not imply single-piece batches and the complete 
elimination of buffers.  In many cases, the “piece” in single-piece flow may be composed of 10, or 100, or 
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There are core lean tools that many managers are familiar with, which can significantly 
“lean up” a workplace, such as value-stream mapping, setup reduction and 
standardization and quality control techniques including 5S and total productive 
maintenance (TPM).29 Our research has revealed that some of these practices can be 
implemented without much regular, substantive participation by workers, yet with some 
degree of continuous improvement, so long as the management and engineering staff are 
diligent about working out the kinks and making periodic alterations to production 
processes. When managers focus largely on these lean manufacturing practices – under a 
regime of consultative participation or, even less effectively, with essentially imposed 
participation – plants can become relatively lean, yielding significant performance 
improvements in terms of reduced inventory and improved quality and productivity. 
Under consultative participation workers may be asked their opinions but problem 
solving and decision-making authority have not been fully or effectively devolved to the 
workforce. To reap the full benefits of moving to a bufferless, continuous-flow system 
requires the successful implementation of a HR practices and cultural change that sustain 
an engaged, high-involvement workforce. When successfully implemented, such a 
system will include substantive participation from a large portion of the workforce. Given 
that sustained continuous improvement requires the regular flow of information – 
practical, experiential knowledge and tacit, expert knowledge – from workers, active, 
substantive participation is required to make the system hum. In this case plants should 
see even more significant performance improvements, not only in terms of productivity 
and quality but also in terms of flexibility and delivery, as workers drive lead time 
reduction through continuous process improvement. Shorter lead times improve the 
ability to increase product variety with given resources and timeframes.  
 
From the HR side, the most basic component of a learning/HPWO is adequate training of 
the workforce, including training in problem-solving and decision-making, in addition to 
multiskilling through cross training. Training should be considered an ongoing process, 
rather than a one-off effort – for example, giving workers a half-day training in lean 
principles is not sufficient. Further, workers need to be given adequate resources to take 
on their new roles, including access to information and the skills of experts. Care must be 
taken to assure that other aspects of the work system – such as pressures to keep a line 
going and/or to meet certain efficiency targets – do not interfere or conflict with the 
enlarged roles of workers. Workers should be organized into teams, including online 
teams organized around work groups and offline teams that meet for problem-solving and 
continuous-improvement planning. Authority to make decisions and engage in problem 
solving activities must be given to workers in a way that encourages these behaviors.  
  
Because more is being asked of workers, they should be compensated 
accordingly.Appropriate contingent pay schemes – pay for skill or knowledge, 
                                                                                                                                                 
even 1000 units.  And modest buffers, often called “supermarkets,” may be appropriate to help keep 
production level and flowing. 
29 5S is a methodology for improving workplace efficiency and safety, based on Japanese techniques, 
which is roughly translated as sort, set in order, shine, standardize, and sustain.  
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gainsharing, profit- sharing – should be tailored to fit a given situation. Equally 
important, the value of communication cannot be overstated: many attempts are 
workplace restructuring are stalled or failed because of a reticence and resistance by the 
workforce, much of which results from a lack of communication combined with improper 
financial incentives. Thus, it should be communicated to the workforce that the change 
expected is quite dramatic, including much more expected of the workers. This 
communication needs to be not only consistent, but consistently backed by deeds, 
including appropriate compensation. Asking more of workers and making their jobs more 
stressful without increasing compensation is a recipe for failure.  
 
Ultimately, to sustain this type of cultural change, in addition to better communication 
and increased compensation, three ingredients are necessary: upper management must be 
fully supportive of the initiative; trust must be built through deeds (or made unnecessary 
by clear worker protections and legal and contractual safeguards), including successful 
efforts with new routines; and workers must be sure of their own job security (and, 
preferably, see a way to capture some of the financial gains of higher productivity). For 
example, plant mangers must be given enough leeway to implement organizational 
changes, such as improved process flow to reduce lead time, that often do not result in 
immediate results as measured by traditional cost accounting metrics; or they should be 
encouraged to engage workers in “offline” continuous improvement activities even 
though these may conflict with traditional cost accounting metrics such as labor 
utilization. Managers should begin with simpler projects that have a high probability of 
success – such as a 5S event in a particularly cluttered workspace or a setup reduction on 
a particularly long setup, rather than, say, attempting a first value stream map a 
complicated product family – so that they can demonstrate the effectiveness of a given 
organizational change and then document and communicate the success story. 
 
The cases 
 
Our qualitative analysis is based on in-depth, open-ended interviews in 17 plants, 
including six union shops and eleven nonunion shops. In each case we spoke with a plant 
manager. In addition, we spoke with between four and six workers in as many of the 
cases as we could, though we were not able to speak with workers in every plant because 
some plants were too busy to provide so much time. We collected internal company 
documents and data on wages, productivity and other performance metrics where 
possible. Given the sensitive and sometimes incomplete nature of some of this data for 
particular firms, however, we are unable to conduct any systematic quantitative analysis 
of performance outcomes. These data are still quite useful in our overall assessment of 
the plants in the qualitative analysis. 
 
All of the plants included in our analysis are in the component manufacturing sector. 
They supply metal and plastic parts and subassemblies to OEMs or their first-tier 
suppliers; thus, some of the cases here are first-tier suppliers and others are lower-tier 
suppliers. One of the plants supplies wire wheels for industrial welding and also supplies 
this product directly to consumers as an OEM product. Another plant is partially an 
internal supplier to a parent firm that sells an OEM product. Most of the plants are small 
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or medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), employing between 50 and 500 workers; only a few 
are large organizations employing over 500 workers. 
 
Using the learning/HPWO model presented above as a framework to orient our analysis, 
we provide a brief overview of the cases, first for the nonunion plants then for the union 
plants. This overview sets up the core of our qualitative analysis, a cross-case comparison 
of union versus nonunion shops for our 12 high-wage plants, and then a comparison of 
high-wage versus low-wage shops for our 11 nonunion plants.31  We also distinguish 
high- and low-productivity plants, using the measure value-added per employee as a 
stratifier.  Table 5 presents the distribution of plants based on these criteria. 
 
Table 5. Our Case Studies 
 High-wage Low-wage 
 High Value-Added 
per Employee 
Low  Value-
Added per 
Employee 
High  Value-Added 
per Employee 
Low  Value-Added 
per Employee 
Nonunion Industrial Pumps 
Auto Stampings 
Cat Gears 
 
Tubefab 
Integrated 
Metalfab 
 
Midwest 2nd Tier 
Plastic Grilles 
Standard Sensors 
Suburban Midget 
Rubber Products 
Union Second Tier 
Custom Seats 
Sealmaster 
Aircraft Parts 
Auto Moldings 
Mini OE 
 
   
 
We think that the more technical aspects of lean production methods are relatively 
straightforward – though by no means unproblematic – to implement when compared 
with the more social aspects regarding worker participation and cultural change. As 
mentioned, there is a “toolbox” of lean techniques – cells, JIT and continuous flow; 
kanban and other visual control systems; 5S and TPM standardization methods; setup 
reduction – which can be implemented in varying combinations to provide substantial 
performance improvements.  The 58 centers of NIST’s Manufacturing Extension 
Partnership (MEP) offer training and consulting on this toolkit in all 50 US states. While 
proper implementation of these techniques can be quite demanding, even more 
challenging and troublesome is the successful transformation of HR systems and 
workplace culture to include sustained, substantive participation of the workforce.  (Here, 
there is far less available and competent help, either from MEP and MEP-like programs 
or from international unions.  Unions are much more active in this field in northern 
Europe.) 
 
                                                 
31 Ideally we would provide a comparison of all four possible cells in the high-wage/low-wage, 
union/nonunion matrix. However, as we were unable to gain access to any low-wage union shops, we focus 
only on the two comparisons.  
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Nonunion plants 
 
Of the six high-wage nonunion plants we observed, only one – Industrial Pumps – 
successfully implemented learning/HPWO, including both the system-wide 
transformation to lean production techniques and the continuous improvement culture 
based on substantive participation by parts of its workforce. Here, the skill content of 
many jobs has increased, and high wages and high productivity are closely linked. In two 
other plants, Auto Stampings and Cat Gears, a culture of continuous improvement with 
some degree of substantive participation – though participation in decision-making 
remained consultative – was implemented despite a lack of lean practices in terms of 
waste reduction and process standardization. At Auto Stampings, high productivity was 
supported by a focus on quality improvement by skilled workers – operating within the 
context of a very informal small shop – combined with high automation and high uptime; 
in this case high wages and productivity were closely linked. This case demonstrates the 
effectiveness of workers engaged in substantive participation to continuously improve 
processes and product quality. At Cat Gears, high productivity was supported by high 
levels of investment in automation, high asset utilization, and a dedicated workforce.  
 
In the three other high-wage nonunion plants – Tubefab, Integrated, and Metalfab – 
relatively high wages were supported despite having mid-level productivity.  The plants 
were able to get a good quality product out the door at competitive price, but each fell 
short of approaching the low-waste, high-performance ideal; daily routines of workers 
and workplace culture are largely the same. These plants approximate a lean 
standardization model, using some combination of lean methods within a framework of 
consultative participation. While some significant performance improvements were 
achieved, each retained a relatively traditional authority structure rather than a worker-
driven, vibrant culture of continuous improvement.  
 
Of the five low-wage nonunion plants we observed, two have implemented a lean 
standardization approach, selectively combining some elements of lean with more 
traditional manufacturing prowess to yield relatively high productivity. These plants – 
Midwest Second Tier and Plastic Grilles – have combined some technical elements of 
lean production with a particular expertise – innovative, complex tooling with high-
skilled craft workers and good cost knowledge with adept product selection – to support 
high productivity in a low-wage environment of minimal participation. These cases 
exemplify the benefits of stable, high-volume demand allowing investment in high-
quality assets and high asset utilization. For operators and other production workers, skill 
profiles and daily routines have changed little. A third case, Standard Sensors, is similar 
to the first two but with low wages. Sensors is an archetypical case of the lean 
standardization strategy: very lean on many technical aspects but within a regime of 
consultative participation with little effective input from the workforce. They also 
provide a good example of a how lack of support by upper management can block efforts 
to push lean toward a high-performance model; in this case, perhaps, an active local 
union could have played a role in helping to bring upper management ‘on board’ in this 
regard. The final two low-wage firms, Suburban Midget and Rubber Products, are cases 
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of the low-cost strategy, with little or no implementation of lean practices or worker 
involvement.  
 
We briefly discuss each of these cases in turn.  Readers will note that in only the first of 
these 11 nonunion plants (Industrial Pumps) do we see anything that deserves to be called 
“learning lean.”  Many of the other ten increased their inventory turns, but mainly by 
discovering that they did not need to fully replenish raw and finished goods stocks.  For 
many, work-in-process (WIP) inventory (which maps directly to manufacturing lead time 
and which, we have found, is where worker knowledge is often most critical) showed a 
much smaller decline. 
 
Industrial Pumps restructured from an extremely disconnected system in which each 
operation was scheduled independently of the others; they worked from forecasts, making 
dozens of parts for each final assembly with pallets of parts scattered everywhere. Two 
full-time expeditors spend “all day, every day, walking three or four different parts 
through the plant just to get a couple orders off.” Having moved away from forecasting, 
they now make only what they have orders for. Since implementing a number of lean 
practices with the help of the Wisconsin Manufacturing Extension Program (WMEP), 
Industrial is dramatically more flexible. For example, on their CNC machining centers, 
setup has gone from an hour and 15 minutes to 10 minutes or less. Five years ago they 
were quoting lead times at two weeks and typically shipping in about four weeks. Now 
they’re quoting one to two weeks and shipping in about four days. On time delivery has 
gone from 30 percent to about 90 percent. Inventory turns have improved, from below 
two up to around eight.  Though far from world-class, Industrial Pumps expects to see 
continued improvements in turns as it continues to focus on reduction of lead times and 
WIP inventories.  
 
Some amount of substantive empowerment has been achieved at Industrial, particularly 
with in terms of some real problem-solving opportunities, of which some workers have 
taken advantage. The main form of substantive participation is through offline teams, 
including 5S, setup reduction, and VSM continuous improvement teams. While many 
workers did not experience much opportunity to participate in decision-making and 
problem solving, management did appear to be successfully working toward sustained 
cultural change, taking things slowly and building support and trust through designing 
effective projects. For instance, in a 5S event workers realized they had seven sets of 
Craftsman tools, each with a full set of metric and English wrenches.  Yet they did not 
even need a wrench in the cell.  
 
Auto Stampings is a single-plant firm that used to be a supplier to the toy industry, but has 
reinvented itself as an auto supplier. At the time of our visit, the firm was in the middle of 
a generational transition. We talked to the son, who had many ideas he was trying to 
pursue simultaneously: get out of tool and die because it was cheaper to outsource it, buy 
expensive CNC equipment and expand the tool and die offerings, do assembly as well as 
stamping of parts, and find a Mexican or Korean partner to do production. The company 
was 40 percent employee owned, and the employees would own a majority (part of their 
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pay was in stock) in a few years, but he did not think this would lead to a change in 
direction for the company. 
 
Most of the workers at Auto Stampings are highly skilled operators, most of whom have 
gone through an apprenticeship program, setting up and running stamping presses. The 
factory seemed a blend of deep craft knowledge with a fair amount of new fangled TQM. 
While workers seemed to have a fair amount of influence and autonomy based on their 
individual technical knowledge, their authority was limited to  quality, and did not extend 
to making decisions about waste reduction and improved product flow.  Their efforts on 
TQM resulted in standardization of processes for installing and storing dies, for example, 
but there was also great emphasis on discovering the root causes of problems. While they 
did not have standardized work diagrams hanging from their machines, as is typical of 
TQM, they effectively do continuous improvement through a sustained focus on 
investigating procedures to see if they are the best ones and trying to get workers to 
follow the procedures.  
 
Auto Stampings was not very lean in terms of implementing things such as visual 
controls, cells, or JIT. However, they do effectively implement continuous improvement 
with some degree of substantive worker participation, though this takes place within a 
traditional authority framework. Based on their craft knowledge, and within definite 
limits, workers were actively engaged in problem solving. In terms of decision-making 
participation remained consultative. This relentless focus on quality improvement by 
skilled workers – operating within the context of a very informal small shop – combined 
with high automation and high uptime, results in high productivity. This plant illustrates 
the benefits of having highly skilled workers and a relatively high degree of worker 
participation in problem solving and continuous improvement, even without the other 
elements of lean production. At the same time, however, this lack of standardization and 
codification of procedures may be problematic for plant management in the long term if 
such craft knowledge remains tacit.  
 
Cat Gears is a supplier virtually 100 percent dedicated to Caterpillar. Cat Gears was 
privately held until 1996, when it was purchased as a wholly owned subsidiary of Okubo 
Gear in Japan. Until the firm moved into a new facility in 1997, the parts Cat Gears made 
were virtually all mid-sized gears, made by standard gear-cutting processes. At about that 
time, Cat Gears made a strategic decision to move into producing significantly larger, 
more complex parts. Besides their complexity, the sheer size of these parts affords Cat 
Gears some protection against offshore competition.  
 
Cat Gears is active in trying to get high school students to see that gear-making is high-
pay, high-skill work. It maintains functional departments (machining centers, lathes, etc.) 
and designates a group of five “leaders,” the most vital people, who do and oversee 
setups, and make sure their department is in order. The leaders earn $18-20 per hour, 
while the other shop floor people – operators, machinists and setup people – range from 
$12 to $16. Everyone who demonstrates the aptitude and the willingness to seek out 
opportunities has a chance to move up.  Since they have been and continue on a growth 
path, Cat Gears is always looking for good people and is always interested in pushing 
 36
people up the skill curve. Employees at Cat Gears work very hard, but the work is varied 
and challenging.  
 
A typical new hire may run one of the gear-cutting or other machines that only requires 
monitoring one tool at a time. As workers progress, they move to machines that have 
more expensive tooling (and where mistakes are therefore costlier) and/or have multiple 
tools that require them to be monitoring and measuring more things. Operators do their 
own inspection. Cat Gears’ view is that, even with its skill and investment, it could not 
survive if it were a full-blown craft shop that paid all of its workers $18-30 an hour.  Its 
“HR innovation” is its pay-tiering in the presence of steady sales growth: it makes highly 
complex parts even though 45 of its 50 shop workers make less than $16 per hour.  
Growth means steady pay progression for those that stay, even though there is a wall for 
most at $16. 
 
There are no cells and Cat Gears’ president scoffs at talk of  “lean production.”  An ex-
gear-cutter himself, he views it as a silly formalization of common sense: “Don’t waste 
time and if you can run three machines instead of two, then do it.  Inspect your own 
work, and clean up your own mess.”  This same anti-waste attitude extends to material: 
inventory turns are above 15, placing Cat Gears in the 85th percentile for its industry. 
 
Tubefab originally located in a rural area to take advantage of low wages, but now has the 
highest wages in its area because suburban sprawl has put it in competition with nearby 
urban labor markets. In much of the plant, Tubefab has become relatively lean by 
implementing JIT routines. They have moved from having separate functional 
departments for tube bending, tube finishing, and tube assembly to having all of 
operations combined in a single fabrication department composed of product-focused 
cells. Inventory buffers have been reduced and batch production has been replaced with 
continuous flow in tube fabrication. Tubefab maintains a separate press department, in 
large part because of some huge 400-ton straight-side presses that would be “a logistical 
nightmare” to move. As the plant manager noted, their highest-volume cell runs 140 parts 
an hour, versus 2000 parts an hour on their largest presses.  
 
Rather than tackling the problem directly, by focusing on setup reductions and process 
mapping and engaging workers to find innovative ways to work out it out, management is 
preoccupied with traditional mass-production metrics such as direct labor utilization. 
Tubefab is doing well in terms of profits, customers, and quality; since they have 
implemented their limited, selective version of lean production, their ppm’s – defective 
parts per million, a key quality measure for large volume producers – have gone from 
around 1500 to around 100 and on-time delivery has gone from below 90 percent to 
about 98 percent. Yet Tubefab has fallen far short of its productive potential, in part 
because it has focused on the technical aspects of lean without moving toward 
substantive participation and cultural change necessary to implement continuous 
improvement to more effectively use labor and eliminate unnecessary activities.  
 
Note that effective use of labor may be different than the “efficient” use of labor in the 
traditional cost accounting sense: the former includes use of workers in ways that may 
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conflict with the latter, such as for brainstorming and problem solving even if on paper 
those reduce direct labor utilization. In Tubefab’s case, technical problems and an 
emphasis on particular metrics such as inventory reduction and on-time delivery – rather 
than efforts on training workers to be broadly skilled problem-solvers – dominate the 
agenda. While employee input is actively solicited and workers’ ideas are often tried, this 
process operates within the framework of a traditional authority hierarchy – topics and 
goals are defined by management, employee autonomy is severely restricted, and 
deliberation and decision-making are limited. The mechanisms of EI here function to 
extract workers’ ideas for continuous improvement without devolving authority. The 
process is directed and controlled by managers and engineers. Furthermore, the extent of 
EI is limited not only in depth but in breadth. Offline teams are staffed by a limited group 
of volunteers and the tendency not to “pull them off the line” further limits the breadth of 
EI. As one worker indicated, “We have a few meetings. You know they’ve got meetings 
where you can put your input in. If something gets done or not is another story, but they 
do let you put your input in.”  
 
Integrated is a classic example of a hybrid organizational form: some of the work is 
organized into functional departments and other work is organized into product-focused 
departments that largely cellularized. The division of labor includes highly detailed job 
classifications (of standardized and often rote tasks) organized into online work teams 
that are involved in continuous improvement activities, as well as offline quality and 
process improvement teams in each department. Integrated claimed to be running small 
lot sizes and doing JIT, though it was not clear to how thoroughly and effectively they 
had implemented these practices; observations during a plant tour suggested that there 
may be some serious problems with haphazard product routings and work flow. 
Nonetheless, they have implemented continuous flow principles with pull systems in 
certain areas and claim that on-time delivery, quality, and inventory management have 
been steadily improving, though we were unable to get any specifics.  
 
While engineers and managers at Integrated are constantly tinkering with the production 
process and standardizing better methods, they do so without much substantive 
involvement of front-line workers. While workers are offered the opportunity – indeed, 
highly encouraged – to give their ideas about process improvement, their jobs are in 
general highly regimented and traditionally organized. With their online teams of cross-
trained workers Integrated had achieved a substantial amount of functional flexibility in 
their ability to deploy the same labor for different product lines and task mixes. They are 
relatively lean in terms of practices like point of use production, smaller lot sizes, and 
less work-in-progress (WIP) inventory. Yet aside from rotation among highly regimented 
and rote jobs and the opportunity to give ideas, workers have not seen much change in 
daily routines or “job enrichment” in terms of substantive participation; wages have not 
been affected by restructuring to lean production methods.32   
                                                 
32 We do not wish to equate the opportunity or obligation to participation, let alone the existence of lean 
production methods, with job enrichment. While we do think that under the right conditions opportunities 
for substantive participation in problem solving and decision-making may lead to job enrichment through 
multiskilling and increased authority and autonomy, we also recognize that lean production can lead to job 
intensification and speedup, and that certain individuals may prefer a traditional mass production 
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Metalfab Plus is an ESOP that does sheet metal fabrication and is trying to turn into a 
“solutions” provider for customers, taking on more assembly, painting and quick-turn 
prototyping work. Metalfab claimed to be about 90 percent complete on a full plant re-
layout. Business had grown in phases, adding capacity in functional chunks, with no 
regard for flow; now, the firm is going to point-of-use and better flow. While they 
thought they had become lean, there are still some serious problems with the layout and 
organization. Metalfab has some quasi-cells, with lasers feeding work to press brakes and 
then welding, but there are also functional areas, with areas for stamping, machining and 
welding. There is also a lot of relatively large batch processing. Only five to ten percent 
of their products are on a kanban system. They are still working on this and on setup time 
reduction, problems with which are making them hold a lot of WIP. They have nominal 
teams organized around departments or areas, but they meet quarterly at most. They want 
to get to having them meet at least once per week, but do not seem to have much notion 
of systematic, substantive participation of the workforce. Basically, they do triage job 
rotation, but nothing formal, though there are plans to set up a formal cross training 
program. Metalfab had essentially done process mapping “on a hunch,” and were really 
just groping around without an clear vision of manufacturing excellence. Restructuring 
has not affected job content or wages really at all. Despite these problems with workflow 
and relatively high WIP, Metalfab has seen inventory turns improve to around 10 due to 
better management of raw- and final-goods inventories. 
 
Midwest Second Tier, a deep-draw stamping outfit, specializes in high-tolerance parts 
which require expensive tooling and high volumes. This has made them more dependent 
on the auto industry than they would like to be.  They have been trying to diversify, but 
found that their niche is getting automotive customers tooling for which “they’re willing 
to pay the bigger buck ...” In addition to doing complex, tight-tolerance parts, their 
strategy has been to try to do everything “in the press,” meaning that they minimize 
secondary operations by trying to work them into the press operation. With their core 
specialty essentially being do-it-all-in-the-press, they are heavily dependent on the 
toolmakers. They are an interesting case because they show that what is often alleged to 
be the case in craft-led union shops, can apply in non-union shops, too: a conflict 
between craft domination and the standardized work components of lean production. 
 
Midwest has implemented lean practices in a piecemeal and selective fashion. Their own 
particular version of lean is focused on 5S standardization efforts for regular operators 
and improved product flow. They have done some work with cells but are making 
excuses for why they cannot adopt a systematic and comprehensive package of lean 
practices – primarily in terms of their situation as a contract manufacturer with highly 
variable demand and complex tooling. The overall system has been rationalized and 
partially restructured based on flow principles, though inventories have not really been 
reduced.   Part of their ability to do innovative things with tooling comes from the fact 
                                                                                                                                                 
environment with its various buffers to the more demanding environment of lean production which, with its 
increased responsibilities may be perceived by many as more stressful (see Matt Vidal, “Lean Production, 
Worker ‘Empowerment,’ and Job Satisfaction: A Qualitative Analysis and Critique,” mimeo, University of 
Wisconsin-Madison, 2004).   
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that they have their toolmakers spend a lot of time out in the floor helping with the 
setups. Operators run two to three presses at a time but do not do any formal job rotation 
or cross training beyond that. Participation is on an individual basis and is consultative, 
other than the direct input into tool design given by toolmakers. The teams do not do 
much other than work around the same set of presses together. They do not have any 
offline teams, though it appears that these could be very useful – e.g., increasing 
communication between toolmakers (team leads) and quality engineers to do root cause 
analysis or standardizing best practice across cells. For regular operators, wages and job 
content have not been changed by the lean restructuring. A lot of the problems discussed 
were “depends on the person” type problems, where creative and motivated individuals 
would do troubleshooting and problem solving in a fire-fighting, very un-lean way. 
Substantive participation and a sustained focus on cultural change could probably 
improve their flexibility and productivity, though they have achieved relatively high 
productivity through a traditional focus on high utilization combined with investment in 
high-quality, innovative tooling.  
 
Plastic Grilles is quite similar to Midwest, with its focus on innovating tooling and high- 
volume, high-utilization manufacturing. Plastic Grilles’ owners began as mold brokers in 
Portugal, and firmly believe that, in molding, tooling is the basis of the business.  Being 
90-95 percent automotive-dependent, Plastic Grilles has only recently tried to come up 
with proprietary products for, among others, the hand-tool (hammer handle covers) and 
consumer goods (spatulas) markets. In the tooling business, work is organized in 
functional departments, the largest of which houses more than a dozen CNC mills used 
for making and repairing molds.  In the molding business, the shop is organized into cells 
by product line and, within speaker covers, by customer; more than 80 percent of the 
workforce is Hispanic. In the tooling business the machinists work with the family-
member owner/managers to decide how work is organized, while in the molding 
business, the managers – many of whom speak little or no Spanish – decide. 
 
Plastic Grilles’ high productivity owes mightily to successful management of rapid 
growth.  Between 1996 and 2004, sales more than quadrupled, while employment only 
rose 144 percent from 45 to 110. In 2000, value-added per FTE stood at $75,670, solidly 
in the top quartile for injection molders serving automotive.  This solid productivity 
showing partly reflects a good knowledge of costs, plus the confidence to walk away 
from money-losing jobs: more than once, Plastic Grilles has called a customer and told it 
to come pick up the mold(s) for a job it had decided to drop. Productivity has also been 
enhanced by Plastic Grilles’ ambitious migration from producing speaker covers into 
making all of the plastic parts within a speaker assembly. 
 
But in some areas that could raise productivity, Plastic Grilles performs at or below 
industry average levels. Inventory turns are stuck in the 7-8 range, well below the 
automotive injection-molder norm of 10-13. The difference reflects roughly $750,000 
tied up in excess inventory.  Some of this is justified by the need to hold some finished 
goods inventories in low-volume parts, but most reflects a failure to get lean. Efforts in 
this direction seem blocked, partly because the workforce is not consulted and partly 
because the owners’ real focus is on toolmaking. Management hopes and anticipates that 
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the move to the new, larger facility will improve flow, but there is little basis for this 
faith.   
 
From the standpoint of job quality and its relationship to manufacturing performance, 
Plastic Grilles follows a familiar dualistic pattern.  It values its managerial and 
tooling/repair personnel and pays them well, but is at best a mid-wage, mid-commitment 
employer for semi-skilled labor.   
 
In any case, Plastic Grilles’ approaches seem to support fast growth and solid 
productivity. Its struggles to achieve compliance with the QS 9000 quality standard, to 
reduce turnover and inventories, and address uneven machine uptime collectively raise 
the issue whether a learning/HPWO strategy might work even better. Ironically, good 
tool-making, marketing, sales, and product lines have reduced the pressure to get lean. A 
view of injection molding as routine work has bred inattention to the low-wage 
immigrant workforce, creating a culture in which lean techniques might be hard to 
implement.   
 
Standard Sensors has four US plants that make similar products: relatively complicated 
assemblies of sensors and actuators for automobiles. Two of their plants were organized 
almost exclusively into cells while the other two, recently acquired from a different 
company, were not as extensively organized into cells. The two more fully cellularized 
plants were impressive in their adoption of the many technical aspects of lean – there 
were many special jigs and fixtures to make it hard to create a defect, and products were 
designed for manufacturing to facilitate this sort of thing. The plants were spotless and 
defects were relatively few. Despite being quite lean in these respects, worker 
involvement in continuous improvement activities was amazingly small; the workers in 
the cells largely followed the standardized work practices. Engineers designed all the jigs 
and occasionally they would consult a worker at the station they were improving, but this 
was difficult in two of the plants because most workers there did not speak much English.  
 
However, workers did build up skill in their jobs, due to long tenure. Keeping this 
workforce was a key consideration when growing sales dictated a new plant. The 
company’s board (located in Ohio) wanted the plant in Ohio, but the plant manager 
convinced them that it should be within commuting distance of the old one.  
 
One of the less cellularized plants had some attempts at continuous improvement driven 
by a real lean fanatic who was given a title “Wizard of WOW”, where WOW was war on 
waste. He had implemented one cell, with the help of the Toyota Supplier Support 
Center, who had organized a team of workers to give input, in a consultative fashion. 
While some of the workers did express that they felt empowered by this (and a few later 
promoted to supervisor), this big push seemed to have been a kind of one-time thing. The 
Wizard of WOW seemed to have a good rapport with material handlers and supervisors 
at the plant, but did not involve operators in continuous improvement. Operators very 
definitely felt that the company did not listen to their ideas in general. Further, the 
Wizard complained that he could not get much budget to do his projects, even though he 
had carefully documented the savings. The new owners removed him from the executive 
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bonus plan, which caused a significant hit to his pay and self-image. The Sensors case 
provides a good example of the role a union may be able to play in pushing lean toward a 
high-performance model. In this case, despite the vigorous attempts of a lean guru to 
convince upper management to embrace the continuous improvement side of lean, 
management was satisfied with its one big push toward lean standardization.  
 
Suburban Midget, a small nonunion shop with around 30 employees, is a former military 
contractor that has diversified into automotive aftermarket, transportation and 
telecommunications markets. They do job shop stamping and are focusing more on 
terminals and connectors (for electronic wiring). To become competitive in what they 
consider a niche market, they consulted the local MEP center, the Chicago Manufacturing 
Center. “What we learned along the way was that we really needed to become a world-
class competitor and maintain our small company competitive financial structure. The 
best way for us has been to bring in people who understand and can help us make 
selections about world-class software, quality training, and market research.”  
 
Midget’s is a straightforward low-cost producer strategy: “Our big approach is, don’t put 
any money into engineering this thing because there is no value-added. Let us be price- 
competitive and we know how to make the thing to your requirements.”  The company is 
a process specialist that focuses on tool design as a source of cost reduction. Because they 
are in the auto and OEM side of the business, rather than the electronics side, their 
volumes are low. This has kept them from feeling “brutal and massive competition” but 
has also not allowed them to justify potential cost-saving automation. Moreover, their 
inventory turns have actually declined, due to a conscious decision to increase finished 
goods inventory from four to six weeks’ worth to improve responsiveness to key 
customers. 
 
There are 20 direct production workers.  With a fair number of quality people and 
supervisors monitoring a low-paid Hispanic workforce, Midget is not very lean. Part of 
their ability to be price-competitive comes from the fact that they are a dual-language 
facility (the owner speaks Spanish).  They do internal English for Speakers of Other 
Languages (ESOL) and technical training using subsidized consultants, so they are able 
to get good workers who earn more than they would elsewhere yet are cheaper than the 
skilled workers that Midget would otherwise have to hire on the outside. There are a few 
each of tooling machinists, painters, quality inspectors, and material handlers; the rest are 
press operators. In addition to ESL, their training is in “the procedures necessary to 
comply with ISO … [and] also with labor reporting. Our employees take their badge and 
the work order and scan them across a scanner, so we can tell at all times who is where 
and allocate labor.” In short, they are keeping the shop running competitively by having 
workers with “excellent mechanical skills” who are “really focused on the job.” The 
manager also notes that, while “[a]t times, we have had difficulty getting them to be more 
creative and risk-taking … part of that has been addressed through the training process.” 
Essentially, while a few dedicated “core” employees do most of the problem-solving, in 
general there is not much involvement of operators in decision-making or deliberation 
about continuous improvement. 
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Rubber Products is a single-plant firm that was also undergoing a generational transition 
when we visited. The father had bought the company in the 80s. The company managed 
to produce okay quality despite hiring temps from an agency. The lack of standardized 
work was evident with the temps, who were visibly bored, and not doing things the same 
way even twice. Turnover was very high, and there was no involvement in decision-
making by workers. The owner seemed mostly to want to hold on until his last college 
tuition bill was paid. He was a smart, urbane guy, but his business and technical 
knowledge was all self-taught. We watched as he faxed hand-written design changes 
back and forth to his customer. He had also spent “hundreds of thousands of dollars” in a 
successful fight to prevent the just-arrived UAW from getting a first contract. “We made 
a mistake in who we let in – we didn’t screen carefully enough -- and so we got ourselves 
a union.” The owner was viscerally angry about the union and did not deny that he had 
spent far more than the profit-maximizing amount on endless NLRB challenges, “but it’s 
my business, and if I’m going to have a partner I will choose that partner.”  
 
The owner said that he needed to get his quality up and, to do that, needed to pay more. 
The day of our interview, he welcomed his first intern from a university in Michigan that 
has a program in rubber manufacturing. He planned to have several interns, as a way of 
upgrading quality and design. The son, who has a Harvard MBA, is increasingly taking a 
more active role. It looks as though the firm is growing – it had about 50 employees in 
2001, shrank to 30 in 2002, and is now up to 70.  
 
Union plants 
 
Of the six union plants – all high-wage and high-productivity – three had made 
significant progress toward a learning/HPWO that also includes key features of lean 
production. With Second Tier Specialist and Custom Seats, management and the union 
were in a labor-management partnership explicitly conceived to include a highly skilled 
workforce engaged in substantive participation to achieve continuous improvement. Mini 
OE also engaged its union in such a partnership, though it had gotten less far in the 
process due to its having to start with a radically mismanaged workplace. This case is 
interesting, because it was the local union leadership that contacted corporate 
management requesting a new plant management team that would be willing to work 
with the union toward a learning/HPWO approach. In the first two cases, lean methods 
and high-performance HR practices were being implemented in what was already a 
highly disciplined and motivated workforce that had seen high productivity. Further 
benefits were reaped by becoming a learning/HPWO in terms of improved lead times, 
quality and delivery. In the case of Mini OE, a low-productivity plant was transformed 
into a relatively high-productivity plant through the implementation of lean methods. 
They expect to see further improvements as they continue their journey toward 
learning/HPWO.  
 
Each of the other three union shops differs in its own way. Aircraft Parts has achieved 
high productivity with a highly skilled workforce and is now pursing a lean 
standardization strategy. This case is interesting because it illustrates the complexity of 
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truly engaging a workforce in high involvement and highlights the issue of union 
reticence based on long experience with past failures in management-initiated programs. 
The company does not appear to want the union to be too involved because it wants to 
keep its options open regarding the future of the facility.  Management worries that, were 
it to invite the union to be a full partner, the union would then want to be part of such a 
decision. The union leadership would be more involved if the company would listen 
more. The local plant manager would like to move forward with the FULL approach but 
is not sure the union wants or understands it, while the corporate division sees unions as 
an obstacle to flexibility and is trying to figure out a future operations plan and probably 
does not want full-fledged involvement that would necessitate sharing information about 
future options that the union might not like. Both of the other two plants had achieved 
relatively high productivity through high asset utilization and a disciplined workforce. In 
the case of Sealmaster, the plant was bought by a parent company unconcerned with the 
workforce; this parent has essentially abandoned the plant and is likely soon to spin it off. 
In the case of Engineered Plastic Products, management is pursing a strategy of lean 
standardization with little participation from the workforce.   
 
Second Tier Specialist has, with the help of its parent company, completed value stream 
mapping on all of its products and reorganized the whole shop into three cells. Generally, 
the company has made great strides away from having high waste and a splintered 
organizational structure. Lead time has been reduced on two common cylinders from 18 
days to 8 and 5, respectively, and the firm expects further dramatic improvements. On-
time delivery has moved from 27 percent to the 80s in the two years. Inventory turns had 
actually fallen recently to 4.4, in part because of falling sales during the recession but 
also because of the firm’s decision to hold “a little” extra inventory to be responsive 
during the restructuring process. Presumably, this problem will be addressed when it 
begins to focus systematically on setup reduction. 
 
The workforce is mainly white, male skilled machinists who are slowly moving from a 
much more adversarial stance to accepting, and in some cases embracing, a high-
performance work organization model. At Second Tier, they are struggling with the 
cross-training issue, working with a pretty restrictive contract with over 50 job 
classifications and a traditional union culture with long average tenure (22 years). Worker 
resistance to cross-training and job “enrichment” has been a serious obstacle, though 
they’ve had some help with people working outside classifications; otherwise, moving to 
cells would have been “a real mess.” The plant manager discussed how prior 
management hit a brick wall as they attempted to impose lean production and continuous 
improvement from above. The new manager is focusing instead on a slower process of 
education and training, and enlisting the union into a labor management partnership.  
 
As the union president notes, even though the union has formally signed on to a 
partnership, it is a struggle, even with some members of the shop committee. However, 
the labor-management partnership has been instrumental in establishing a framework for 
engaging the workforce in substantive participation. A partnership based around a labor-
management committee helps to move labor-management relations beyond an adversarial 
model and to formalize a framework for collaboration. By providing a framework for 
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formal power sharing and deliberation, such a framework may facilitate a substantive 
participation.  
 
At Second Tier many of the workers had mastered one particular machine and had 
become accustomed to coming in every day and working only on this one machine. Most 
of the workers had a deep craft pride in their work, and expressed keen interest in the 
performance of the plant as a whole. Yet their understanding of their work was very 
much based in and around the routine they had developed by working on a single 
machine. They were not interested in cross training and job rotation; their work values 
were based in doing one thing and doing it well. For these workers new routines and 
responsibilities required a substantial reorganization of work arrangements they had 
appropriated as their own and solidified in a union contract. 
 
The workforce consists of operators with varying skill levels and highly skilled 
machinists. The opportunities for cross training and multiskilling in cells can be seen as 
positive for some of the lower-skilled operators, though the general restructuring was 
highly contested by some and tepidly received by others. The effect of restructuring on 
wages was unclear at the time of our interviews and had yet to be resolved through 
contract negotiations. The parent of the local union has national-level  department that 
has been instrumental in aiding and driving the transition to learning/HPWO. 
 
Custom Seats also has nearly all of its production organized into cells. Inventory turns 
have improved dramatically, from six at the beginning of their reorganization up to 20, 
going up “three to five turns a year every year, since the cellularization effort.”. On-time 
delivery in their oldest cell has gone from 92 percent at best before to a consistent near 
100 percent. One of the main jobs in the shop, sewing, is a highly skill position which 
takes a minimum of twelve weeks to be fully trained on; workers use leather and vinyl 
with very tight seam allowances. There was a lot of craft knowledge possessed only by 
the workers, and the production process was often completely dependent on individual 
experts. Managers discussed in detail how the cells have been used as an opportunity to 
continuing to break down the tasks into smaller parts that can be standardized and the 
tacit knowledge more easily transferred.  
 
At the same time, Custom had in many ways attempted to engage their workforce in 
substantive participation, including broadened responsibilities with increased authority in 
other areas. Thus while deskilled in part through a standardization process workers were 
also reskilled through cross training and given substantially more authority and 
responsibility, which generated role conflict and stress, making some workers feel 
paralyzed. Both the union and management are hoping that when the kinks get worked 
out of the system, the workers will do well with base wages, pay-for-skill and 
gainsharing. At this point, however, the employees are bitter about the gainsharing 
system too, because it applies to cross-shift teams, and workers are really attached to the 
individual incentives that had long been in place. This shift from individual to group 
incentives, along with the Taylorization of craft jobs has made the process of cultural 
transformation highly politicized and problematic, even though the impact on earnings 
has been essentially neutral.    
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In this case, despite the serious efforts of management at decentralizing authority and 
problem-solving responsibilities, empowerment has largely been aborted or stalled due to 
resistance from the union rank and file. The union leadership has been helpful in the 
transition but has also ran into serious problems with resistance from rank and file 
members. This is particularly the case for workers in some areas where the 
aforementioned problems have been particularly acute. Yet, despite these problems, other 
areas of the shop where the cells have been around longer and demand is both stable and 
high, productivity has been quite good. The international union has apparently not offered 
much assistance in terms of learning/HPWO. 
 
Aircraft Parts has 400 unionized employees making highly technical, extremely 
expensive parts in an urban plant belonging to a multinational firm. The parts arrive as 
room-sized castings (costing in excess of $100,000). The plant machines the castings and 
adds electronic and other assemblies. Asked whether there was pressure from 
management to work faster, workers laughed, saying, “And wreck a $100,000 part?” The 
workers earn $19-20 per hour; many have completed a four-year apprenticeship. 
 
When the company seeks to make changes, the union committee is informed and, in 
many cases, makes a counterproposal.  Still, the union noted that it is often consulted too 
late in the process, and that its counterproposals – some of which are designed to 
minimize employee resistance – are sometimes ignored.  A classic example of this is the 
story of Aircraft Parts’ implementation of work cells. Aircraft Parts has dramatically 
reduced its inventory in the last five years by moving to work cells. Moving to cells took 
about one year to negotiate with the union, and is now part of the contract. With the new 
cellular structure, the number of job classifications has been reduced and cell members 
are expected to be multi-skilled to run a number of operations such as lathes, drill presses 
and boring mills. The union had suggested that the company geographically locate the 
cells and move workers when necessary but leave the present occupations alone, but the 
company did not agree and organized these cells around the main products. The union 
recommended that the cells be given generic names such as A, B or C but the company 
created them around product names, resulting in workers identifying with cells and the 
work performed in them. When the company moved work from one cell to another, cell 
members viewed it as “taking our work.” This raised touchy issues, including overtime 
and bumping rights. A grievance was filed over this. Because the plant has departmental 
rather than plant-wide seniority, the issue of where work is performed is very important. 
There are no cell leaders. A ten-minute meeting is held before each shift by managers and 
engineers to review non-conformance issues, but the company says it is trying to get 
more hourly involvement. 
 
This story, and others like it, have shaped the union’s view of the company’s adoption of 
lean.  What could have been a more substantively participative role has become more 
reactive, though not obstructionist.   
 
Nevertheless, the expense and quality sensitivity of the product line give workers a fair 
amount of power in the plant’s day to day operations. The existence of other company 
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plants with similar capacity give it many options to move the work, however.  That has 
resulted in a power imbalance that frustrates union leadership considerably. Although the 
local union believes that it generally has a good relationship with the company and works 
with it to attract additional work into the plant, it feels that it is constantly threatened with 
job loss or downsizing if it does not accept the company’s proposals—both during 
contract negotiations and during the life of the contract. The resulting climate of constant 
negotiation over changes, while facing an ever-cocked gun to the head—especially when 
some of the union’s most important recommendations are not heeded—has intensified 
union discomfort. This is particularly infuriating because the union sees itself as being at 
least as, if not more, committed than management to keeping the local operation 
profitable and productive.  For example, a little over a decade ago, a union-backed plant-
closing assistance group put together a multi-million dollar package of financial 
assistance from the city, county, and state that funded capital improvements and training.  
 
In addition to negotiating with the union for operational and contractual changes, the 
plant has engaged extensively over the past few years in efforts to become more lean, 
utilizing a combination of its own standardized lean training program (developed by the 
University of Texas for worldwide company use) and large customer-driven approaches. 
Its largest customer, for example, provided consultants and ran problem-solving and 
training sessions in the plant. In 2003, the company held 48 such sessions.  But union 
leadership believes that many of these sessions are held only to please these large 
customers rather than to improve plant operation.      
 
The international union has had only modest involvement, partly because the local – 
which only affiliated with an international about ten years ago – remains fiercely 
independent.   
 
Auto Moldings is an auto supplier that makes fairly large interior trim parts, including 
some that customers see, making visual quality and color consistency critical, and 
requiring skills and technology that would be expensive for many would-be competitors 
to duplicate. “Added-value” parts – involving multiple steps (adding foam, clips, ribbing) 
– are where Auto Moldings makes the most money.  Relatively high wages for the 
molding sector ($12-16 per hour) clearly create an incentive to have a lot of newer 
molding machines and keep them running.  Machine operators do not have any real 
responsibility for the machine settings, but only for machine monitoring, load/unload, 
assembly, packaging, and shipping 
 
This arrangement has caused some friction with the union.  Despite Auto Moldings’ 
desire to be lean and have “standard work,” the union feels that a lot of “feel” is required 
to be a good tradesperson (e.g., hotter plant temperatures in the summer require different 
adjustments to molding machines) and wants more recognition for these skills.  Instead, 
the company calls most of these jobs “machine adjusters” and pays them less than the 
jobs in what it views as the critical trades.  Requirements for becoming a machine 
adjuster are about six months of on-the-job training “shadowing” and at least five years 
of experience.  Machine adjusters do fine-tuning of temperatures, water levels, etc., and 
certify jobs as being ready to run.  Supervisors can fill in when these adjusters are not 
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available. The two diesetters (first shift only) and the two maintenance people (first shift, 
but can be called in on other shifts) are viewed as the critical trades, and they are paid up 
to $25/hour.     
 
Essentially, Auto Moldings does what some of the other nonunion plants do: focus on the 
technical aspects of lean production within a framework of consultative participation.  
This resulted in an increase from fewer than 10 to 14.3 inventory turns between 1999 and 
2003, but no progress since then.  A new set of managers reorganized the shop floor in 
2000, adding new injection molding machines and robotics to remove parts from the 
molds.  Most of the plant is laid out in cells, with a clear parent company-driven lean 
approach in mind.  While relations with the union and the workforce appear positive, the 
new equipment and its layout are management-driven, with the workforce lightly 
consulted both directly (meetings with the tradespeople) and via the union. The regional 
and International unions have played no discernible role in any of the restructuring at 
Auto Moldings.  
 
Mini OE is almost fully cellularized with 16 assembly cells constituting four teams. Their 
manufacturing process is quite simple and variations on three basic designs are made.   
With the implementation of cells, lead times have been reduced dramatically from three 
days down to hours. The company does not have much by way of other performance 
metrics, however, because they were not documented until the new management came in 
the year before our interviews. However, with the cells, training, better scheduling, 
material handling, and product flow, they have increased output 18 percent with 17 
percent less workers (though attrition) over the year. Being a make-to-stock 
manufacturer, Mini OE has not reduced its final-goods inventories, though it has seen 
overall inventory turns improve. 
 
While Mini OE has not yet actually gotten to the point of having much substantive 
participation, this case is instructive for its determined attempt to become a “high-
performance work organization,” understood explicitly by management and the union as 
a high-involvement model. Mini OE has done extensive training in literacy and 
numeracy, including blueprint reading and measurement, and they understand this 
training, explicitly as a first step toward empowering the workforce on the road to 
learning/HPWO. The Wisconsin Regional Training Partnership (WRTP) has facilitated 
the development of a labor-management partnership at Mini OE, including helping them 
formulate a core labor-management “leadership” team along with subcommittees 
including a revived a training committee. The WRTP has also helped them formulate 
modules for incumbent worker training and consistent criteria for pre-employment 
screening. Direct employee classifications have been reduced from four to a single job 
classification and all employees moved up to a single pay rate. Due in large part to low 
average tenure in the shop resulting from relatively high past employee turnover, Mini 
OE experienced little resistance to work restructuring from the rank and file. Mini OE 
also differs from many union shops in having had less detailed job classifications to begin 
with.  
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The workforce is highly diverse, with many Asian and black workers.  Jobs are well paid, 
and there are additional opportunities through the pay-for-knowledge program.  
Moreover, once Mini OE gets the kinks worked out and is back to profitability, a 
gainsharing program will raise incomes further. An employee suggestion program was a 
big success, with $4,700 distributed in the first round. Beyond this, however, they have 
not  had much success in getting employee input on improving processes in the cells, 
other than with a few highly dedicated and engaged union activists. While local union 
leadership is playing a key role in the move toward a high-performance version of lean, 
the international has not provided any assistance.    
 
Sealmaster is our worst case scenario for union shops: a company that relied on a 
traditional HR management and authority framework to get leaner, along with a very 
traditional union that displayed little interest in playing a role in operational change. 
Bought by a rootless, disloyal corporate parent, managers got them as lean as they could 
via better process control and improved product flow and other JIT methods, Sealmaster 
may still not be lean enough to survive. To make matters worse, it now appears likely that 
the parent company will divest completely from the plant and relocate its work. The 
international union has chosen not to intercede as of this writing, apparently preferring 
simply to protect its most senior members until they reach retirement. 
 
Union/nonunion comparison: high-wage plants 
 
As should be clear from the foregoing, we observed different methods of achieving high 
productivity and wide variety in how plants reorganized to become leaner. Notably, two 
of the case study firms, Auto Stampings and Cat Gears, do not credit their  high 
productivity to lean methods.  While their performance is quite lean, they describe their 
recipe as combining a dedicated workforce with high levels of investment, automation, 
and asset utilization. Focusing on the other ten high-wage plants, the methods of 
becoming leaner fall into the two basic categories articulated above as alternative models. 
Importantly, these categories were observed in both the union and nonunion cases. First, 
using a lean standardization approach, some plants are able to see significant 
improvements in quality, delivery and price by focusing on technical aspects of lean 
production such as value stream mapping to implement a pull system based on 
continuous flow and JIT principles, implementing standardization techniques such as 5S 
and TPM, and using other lean tools such as setup reduction and kanban visual controls. 
Yet, using this approach to lean each fell short of approaching the low-waste, high-
performance ideal. In this model some combination of lean methods are implemented 
within a framework of consultative participation. While some significant performance 
improvements were achieved, each retained a relatively traditional authority structure 
rather than a worker-driven, active culture of continuous improvement. For the most part, 
the daily routines of workers remain the same and workers are unlikely to see any 
improvements in compensation that would – or should – potentially come along with 
increased investments in training, decision-making authority, and other changes to HR 
management. 
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This model of lean can be contrasted with a second, learning lean model, which 
combines technical elements of lean production with a systematic focus on a culture of 
substantive participation and continuous improvement. In this model, the emphasis on 
extensive employee involvement and the transformation of workplace culture overrides 
tendencies to remain stuck in the conceptual framework of traditional cost accounting, 
with its emphasis on labor utilization, that is characteristic of the lean standardization 
model.34 In the latter, which we observed in both union and nonunion shops, worker 
participation often takes a back seat to other concerns; while workers are asked for their 
ideas they are not systematically engaged in regular and routine problem solving and 
decision-making. The learning lean model, on the other hand, sees investment in workers 
and the engagement of workers in actual deliberation about problem solving and 
continuous improvement as a source of competitive advantage. Implementing systemic 
change and working all the kinks out is a highly demanding process. Engaging workers in 
substantive participation and cultural change is necessary both to provide the best 
information possible about what are often confusing and complicated problems, and to 
ensure that management and workers do not slip back into old and familiar routines.   
 
In short, there is nothing better or worse about union involvement per se. Restructuring to 
learning/HPWO – beyond lean standardization efforts – is a complicated and problematic 
endeavor, whether or not a union is present. Nonunion shops can face obstacles which, 
while not identical to those in union shops, can be equally formidable. Indeed, some of 
the obstacles are the same: worker reticence, lack of support by upper management, lack 
of vision by plant management, focus on traditional cost accounting metrics, trying to 
implement change too fast, not properly implementing the right complementary changes.  
 
Unions can play a decisive role in either direction. When management approaches 
organizational change in the wrong way, unions can provide formidable resistance. Local 
workplace cultures can be very idiosyncratic and tenacious; despite education and 
training workplace cultures can be very hard to change. Unions can exacerbate these 
problems to the extent that they provide a source of identity and/or power for workers. At 
the same time, however, unions can provide employers with a unique source of 
competitive advantage in moving toward extensive substantive participation.  
 
Our observations suggest that unions may help in four ways. First, union governance may 
provide a framework for the substantive devolution of authority to make decisions and 
share power. In three of our cases, labor-management committees provided and, indeed, 
formalized this institutional framework. Second, the informal camaraderie and solidarity 
                                                 
34 Standard cost accounting uses metrics such as labor efficiency, machine downtime, and cost variances 
that are designed for a traditional mass production environment. Lean production, which achieves 
economies by flowing a greater variety and volume of products through a given set of resources, uses 
metrics such as lead time reduction and inventory turns. Implementing lean and HPWO practices may, in 
many cases, show up negatively in standard costing. See Bruce Baggaley, “Solving the Standard Costing 
Problem,” Northwest Lean Networks Feature Article, August 2003, 
http://www.nwlean.net/article0803.htm. In our cases we saw managers using a lean standardization 
approach focus on traditional cost accounting metrics while those implementing HPWO were more focused 
on system-wide change and thus were less likely to see allow standard costing metrics to get in the way of 
efforts at high-performance lean.   
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of a union, where and to the extent it is present, may help management organize the 
workforce to bring them on board. In two of our cases union leadership played a key role 
in organizing support of learning/HPWO among the rank and file. Third, the protection of 
a union contract may embolden workers to say what they think and feel, rather than what 
they think management wants to hear. Fourth, a union leadership dedicated to HWPO 
may actually help organize management and keep it committed to a more participatory 
version of lean production – in effect, pushing management beyond the lean 
standardization model to the high-performance lean model. We saw this in one of our 
cases, where management, discouraged by worker resistance and reticence, may have 
backed off pursing a more extensive system of employee involvement were it not for the 
prodding of union leadership. In another case, it was union initiative that began the 
process of restructuring to learning/HPWO. 
 
In sum, the role of unions in restructuring to lean production is indeterminate, depending 
on the position of the local union, local management, workplace culture, and – as we will 
soon see – the level of support from the international union. When a local union 
leadership is supportive of learning lean, and particularly where there is a labor-
management committee, unions can play a pivotal role in the extent and success of 
workplace restructuring. However, the local union is just one among many factors 
affecting the outcome of efforts at restructuring. In both union and nonunion cases, 
support of upper management and the extent and tenacity of plant management’s vision is 
key. Where management retains a conceptual framework in which traditional cost 
accounting metrics remain important, it may tend to focus more narrowly on lean 
standardization to the neglect of more thorough high-performance lean based on 
substantive participation and cultural change. Further, management may not have all of 
the technical and experiential knowledge required to successfully implement system-wide 
change. For instance, changes in HR system such as training and contingent 
compensation programs may be improperly designed or neglected. Here, again, unions 
may advocate for their members in this regard.  
 
High-wage/low-wage comparison: nonunion plants 
 
Within each wage category of nonunion plants – high-wage and low-wage – there is 
variation in terms of productivity. Within the high-wage category, Industrial pumps, Auto 
Stampings and Cat Gears are high-productivity shops, while Tubefab, Integrated and 
Metalfab are in the mid- to low-range. Integrated and Metalfab are united by an explicit 
attempt to be “good employers,” providing stable jobs with decent wages. Tubefab differs 
somewhat in that it attempted to pursue a low-wage strategy but was forced into paying 
higher wages based on labor market pressures. Standard Sensors is a low-wage plant that 
has achieved high productivity through a lean standardization approach. The other low-
wage plants all focus directly on low wages as a cost-control strategy. Midwest and 
Plastic Grilles are able to implement this strategy and achieve high productivity through a 
high-utilization strategy with a dogged focus on innovative tooling. While some highly 
skilled and well-compensated toolmakers are needed for this strategy, the majority of the 
workforce remains in relatively low-skill operator positions. Suburban Midget and 
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Rubber Products focus exclusively on a low-cost producer strategy, competing on low 
prices but at the expense of low productivity. 
 
Lessons from the Cases 
 
We draw four lessons from the comparison of manufacturing practices across the varying 
wage and employment strategies of the union and nonunion plants. First, a low-cost 
producer strategy may well be viable, as demonstrated by Suburban Midget and Rubber 
Products. Given the right product and labor market conditions – sufficient demand for 
low value-added, high-volume parts and a marginalized-but-hardworking labor force – a 
low-wage strategy can be workable. This model, of course, is precisely the opposite of 
the one advocated here; while it may work for employers, it cannot provide a basis for 
family-supporting jobs nor for progressive regional economic development.   
 
Second, asset quality and utilization are key. The higher-wage, less productive plants 
demonstrate that sufficient demand to sustain high asset utilization can provide a basis for 
relatively high wages when employers are so willing. In particular, Integrated and 
Metalfab are able to provide secure jobs with decent compensation, maintaining good 
enough quality, delivery and price competitiveness, while being lean in some respects but 
without substantive participation (another basis for high wages). At the same time, three 
of the lower-wage, more productive plants – Midwest, Plastic Grilles, and Sensors – 
demonstrate that investment in high asset quality combined with high asset utilization can 
permit relatively high productivity in the absence of high wages and jobs “enriched” 
through substantive participation. These plants provide another alternative to the lean 
route to improved productivity, but at the expense of good wages. Here all of the 
investment is in a core of craft toolmakers and the assets to develop highly innovative 
and productive tooling, while the majority of the workforce remains in low-skill, low-
wage operator positions. Similarly, Cat Gears illustrates the benefits of high asset quality 
and utilization – but in this case with high productivity linked to relatively high wages – 
even in the absence of many technical elements of lean production, such as product-
focused layout, process standardization, or pull systems.  
 
Third, the case of Auto Stampings demonstrates that a culture of continuous 
improvement with some degree of substantive participation can help generate high 
productivity despite a lack of lean practices in terms of waste reduction and process 
standardization. This plant illustrates the benefits of having highly skilled workers and a 
relatively high degree of worker participation in problem solving and continuous 
improvement, even without many of the technical elements of lean production (again in 
terms of layout, standardization, etc.). This lack of standardization and codification of 
procedures, however, may be problematic for plant management in the long term if such 
craft knowledge cannot be transmitted to other workers or to the plant’s institutional 
memory.  
 
Fourth, the high-wage, high-productivity strategy is best achieved through approximating 
as closely as possible the low-waste, high-performance model sketched above. In 
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particular, the strategy, which we advocate, must combine four things, as exemplified by 
Industrial Pumps: 
• A relentless focus on getting right the technical aspects of lean production, 
including process mapping aimed at achieving a pull system based on continuous 
flow 
• The substantive participation of the workforce (and all of the necessary 
concomitant changes in HR management) 
• Cultural change to sustain continuous improvement 
• Sufficient demand to allow high asset utilization. 
When these four features are present, the FULL model can be realized.  In the best case, 
the resulting improvement in lead time permits the supplier to get paid for its enhanced 
responsiveness to customers. This kind of organizational flexibility supported by flawless 
process control is not captured by traditional performance measures even in many firms 
claiming to be “lean.” 
 
Throughout our summary of the union cases, and in our union/non-union comparisons, 
we have treated “union” to mean only the local union operating at the particular facility.  
As we will see, however, whether, to what extent, how, and how well local unions lead, 
mold, or participate in efforts to make their companies leaner and more effective depends 
in part on the attitude of their union’s international toward lean and learning/HPWO, and 
on whether the international provides expertise, encouragement, and guidance. 
 
International Unions and the FULL Recipe 
 
In the United States system of industrial relations, bargaining and other workplace 
industrial relations matters are highly decentralized, with power conferred to both the 
local plant management and the local union leader.  Although in some large, multi-plant 
companies, “headquarters” has assumed that power for management, unions by and large 
have not centralized their operations in such a way.  Although some national 
manufacturing unions assume contract-negotiating responsibility for all their signatory 
employers (particularly on wages and benefits, in pursuit of a national pattern), others do 
not and, in any case, any bargaining on working conditions is the responsibility of the 
local leaders.  This is especially true with regard to smaller unionized employers, which 
are of course the norm in the components industry.  This may need to change: 
internationals may need to invest in staff that are trained to support local unions in 
“FULL” implementation. 
 
Interviews were conducted with staff from seven international unions (identified here as 
A, B, C, D, E, F, and G, to preserve confidentiality) that have a large presence in the 
component sector.35  These seven unions are among the eleven unions with the largest 
                                                 
35 An “international” is a union that represents workers throughout the U.S. and Canada.  A “local” union, 
usually coextensive with a bargaining unit, is an affiliate of an international union that represents workers 
at the plant, sub-plant, or sometimes local multi-plant level.  Some international unions also have regional 
bodies that operate on a geographic scale intermediate between those of the local and the international.  
(For example, a regional body might cover the Midwest.)  The division of power and responsibility, 
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numbers of bargaining units in the component sector.36  Because all these unions 
represent workers outside the component sector as well as within it (and some also 
represent workers outside of manufacturing), the staff members interviewed were those 
believed to be most knowledgeable about the union’s representation of component sector 
workers.37  Each interview was semi-structured and lasted between 1.5 and three hours.  
In addition to the interviews, the international unions provided WAI with documents 
related to their component sector practice with regard to lean and learning/HPWO. 
Although the interviews covered a wide range of topics in component sector work 
organization, technology, union structure, and industrial relations, the most important 
interview results concerned the internationals’ stances toward learning/HPWO in the 
component sector, the extent to which they actively promoted learning/HPWO in the 
component sector, and the degree to which their component sector learning/HPWO 
activities were centralized at the international union level or decentralized to local unions 
or regional bodies.  Table 6 characterizes each of the seven unions along each of these 
three dimensions.38  (Note: In tables 6-7, we abbreviate learning/HPWO as “L/H.”) 
 
• L/H stance refers to the international union’s general attitude toward 
learning/HPWO.  All but one of the seven unions interviewed expressed some 
degree of support for learning/HPWO, believing it to be necessary to improve 
productivity and preserve union jobs.  (Union A has locals and regional bodies 
that favor learning/HPWO but the international union appears neutral toward it.)  
Union C appears to be the most enthusiastic about learning/HPWO but will only 
assist its local unions and employers with learning/HPWO if the employer signs a 
formal agreement with the international; the agreement requires extensive 
information- and power-sharing between the employer and the union, including 
ongoing consultation with the international and substantive participation in 
learning/HPWO decision-making by international and local union representatives.  
(Few employers have been willing to sign such an agreement because they were 
unwilling to share information and decision-making power to the extent that the 
agreement requires.  The case study firm Second Tier Specialist, however, does 
have a formal learning/HPWO agreement with union C.) 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
including power and responsibility for HPWO activities, between the international, local, and regional 
bodies varies among international unions. 
36 Data were obtained from AFL-CIO proprietary sources.  The number of bargaining units in which a 
union represents workers is likely to be highly correlated with but not necessarily the same as the number 
of plants at which it represents workers, since a union may have more than one bargaining unit in a plant.  
The number of bargaining units in which a union represents workers also bears only a loose relationship to 
the number of workers it represents, as bargaining units may vary in size.  In some plants, different groups 
of unionized workers may be represented by different international unions.  It was not feasible, given the 
available data, to estimate the number of component sector workers that each union represents.  There were 
also a few international unions with a large component sector presence with which it was not feasible to 
conduct interviews. 
37 This determination was made on the basis of WAI’s contacts with the international unions. 
38 An international union may treat HPWO differently in the component sector than in other sectors in 
which it represents workers.  For example, union A, which has a neutral stance toward HPWO in the 
component sector, has a positive stance toward HPWO in another of its industries.  In this report all 
references to international unions’ involvement with HPWO refer only to the component sector. 
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• L/H activity refers to the extent to which an international union actively 
formulates and promotes a learning/HPWO strategy among its locals and 
employers.  Not all internationals that favor learning/HPWO are active in 
promoting it.  Union G and, to some extent, union E support learning/HPWO but 
do not actively promote it.  Both of these internationals have staff who are 
knowledgeable about learning/HPWO and have assembled materials to assist their 
locals in deciding how to approach it.  However, both internationals serve as 
resources for their local unions on learning/HPWO issues rather than as catalysts 
for such activity.  If a local union is interested in trying persuade an employer to 
adopt learning/HPWO or in responding to an employer’s desire to adopt a 
consultative version of lean production, the international will provide advice and 
assistance, but the local, not the international, makes the first move within the 
union structure.   
 
Union B is something of a special case because its international is organized in a way that 
reflects the union mergers of which it is a product.  Union B at one time represented 
workers primarily within a single core component industry, but over time it absorbed 
other international unions that represented workers in other industries.  The union B 
international maintains separate divisions for each of these industries and these divisions 
vary in the extent to which they promote learning/HPWO.39  The division of union B in 
which the workers of the case study firm Mini OE are included is pro-active toward 
learning/HPWO. 
 
• L/H centralization refers to the extent to which a union’s learning/HPWO 
activity takes place at the international level (”centralized”) relative to the local 
level (“decentralized”).   
o In unions A and G, the locals do all or most of the work of formulating 
and implementing the union’s learning/HPWO policy.  (In union G the 
international provides advice and assistance to locals that want to deal 
with learning/HPWO and consultative lean production issues.  In union A, 
learning/HPWO appears to be left entirely to locals or regional bodies.)   
o In union F the international’s staff responsible for the union’s component 
sector industries has taken the lead on learning/HPWO.   
o In union B the degree to which learning/HPWO activity is centralized 
varies by industry division.  Mini OE’s division appears to be relatively 
centralized in its approach to learning/HPWO.   
o Union C takes a highly centralized approach to learning/HPWO if an 
employer has signed a formal learning/HPWO agreement with the union; 
in such cases the international sets and drives the implementation of 
learning/HPWO policy (although it consults with the local union on the 
details of implementation).  If union C does not have a formal 
learning/HPWO agreement with an employer then its locals may still 
engage with employers around learning/HPWO or consultative lean 
                                                 
39 Many other international unions are also the product of mergers.  Some of these maintain separate 
industry divisions at the international level while others, such as union D, do not.  Union B is unique 
among the interviewed unions in that its HPWO activity varies by industry division. 
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production but the international will neither support nor hinder the locals 
in doing so.   
o Union D has a unique hybrid of centralized and decentralized 
learning/HPWO activity; the international union first signs a formal 
learning/HPWO agreement with an employer but it then leaves the 
implementation of that agreement largely in the hands of its locals, 
providing them with advice and assistance but not becoming involved in 
the details of implementation.  The result appears to be that that 
learning/HPWO activity varies considerably among locals, much as it 
would in a purely decentralized structure.   
o Union E gives locals some autonomy in the implementation of 
learning/HPWO but implementation is nevertheless done under the 
guidance of the international union.  This arrangement represents a degree 
of centralization intermediate between those of unions C and D. 
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Table 6.  Summary: International Unions & Learning/HPWO (L/H) 
Union L/H stance L/H activity L/H 
centralization 
A 0 0 D 
B + Varies by 
division (+ for 
division 
relevant to case 
study firm Mini 
OE) 
Varies by 
division (+ for 
division 
relevant to case 
study firm Mini 
OE) 
C ++ if formal 
partnership, 
else 0 
++ if formal 
partnership, 
else 0 
C if formal 
partnership, 
else D 
D + + D on 
implementation 
after C 
agreement 
E + + C with some 
local autonomy 
in 
implementation 
but 
implementation 
is centrally 
guided 
F + + C 
G + 0 D 
Key: L/H stance=international union’s general attitude toward learning/HPWO 
         L/H activity=International union’s degree of involvement in actively supporting L/H 
         L/H centralization=Extent to which international union’s activities in support of L/Hare 
centrally driven by international officers or staff versus being driven by requests from locals 
- =very negative, - =negative, 0 =neutral, + =positive, ++ =very positive 
C=centralized, D=decentralized 
 
These results suggest that international unions are most able to formulate and promote a 
learning/HPWO strategy if they centralize their learning/HPWO activities at the 
international level.  Unions C, D, E, and F, which centralize learning/HPWO to the 
greatest extent among the interviewed unions, appear to be most active in supporting 
learning/HPWO.  Union G, in which most learning/HPWO activity is decentralized to 
locals and the international serves only as a resource to locals, is less active in supporting 
learning/HPWO and does not appear to have a strategy for it.  Union B is active and 
strategic about learning/HPWO in those industry divisions in which learning/HPWO 
activity is centralized but less active and strategic about it in those industry divisions in 
which learning/HPWO is decentralized.   
 
The policy implication of this analysis for international unions is that if an international 
union wants to support the adoption of learning/HPWO in the plants in which it 
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represents workers it is likely to be most effective in doing so if it maintains strong 
central control over the formulation and implementation of learning/HPWO strategy.  
This does not mean that local unions need be uninvolved in implementing 
learning/HPWO; indeed, they must be involved because learning/HPWO consists of 
changes in work organization and decision-making at the plant level.  But internationals 
that are serious about learning/HPWO cannot leave decisions about whether or how to 
engage employers to their locals. 
 
International union policy toward learning/HPWO, of course, is not the only determinant 
of whether learning/HPWO is adopted at the plant level.  The six unionized plants 
described in our case studies illustrate that local union policy toward learning/HPWO, 
rank-and-file worker attitudes, and management behavior also affect the implementation 
of learning/HPWO (or of less extensive “lean enough” production methods).  Table 7 
summarizes these findings.  
 
At Second Tier, which has implemented learning/HPWO more extensively than any other 
case study plant, both the international and local actively support learning/HPWO.  The 
international and corporate management have a formal learning/HPWO agreement that 
requires substantial information- and power-sharing.   
 
At the opposite extreme, the three plants at which union A represents workers have seen 
either no change in traditional U.S. manufacturing production methods or the 
implementation of a low-involvement, consultative “lean enough” production system 
reminiscent of that found in many of our nonunion case study plants.  In the union A 
plants, the absence of international union involvement in work reorganization, coupled 
with either an absence of local union involvement or a cautious and reactive stance on the 
part of the local union, seems to have given management (at the plant and/or corporate 
level) the ability to implement the kind of work reorganization (or lack of work 
reorganization) that it desires. 
 
At the remaining two plants, Custom Seats and Mini OE, learning/HPWO is being 
implemented, albeit less extensively than at Second Tier.  Moreover, this is occurring 
with the support of the local unions but without any active support by the internationals 
(despite the fact that the relevant internationals generally are active in support of learning 
HPWO and that one of them has a centralized approach to it).  At Custom Seats, 
substantial rank-and-file worker resistance to learning/HPWO may be preventing the 
local union and management from moving forward with more extensive learning/HPWO 
reforms. 
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Table 7.  Summary of International and Local Unions and L/H Implementation at 
Unionized Case Study Plants 
Case study 
plant 
International 
union 
International 
union L/H 
activity at 
plant 
Local 
union L/H 
activity at 
plant 
L/H 
implementation 
Other 
influences on 
plant-level 
L/H 
Second Tier C ++ + Extensive L/H International 
and corporate 
management 
have formal 
L/H 
agreement 
Custom 
Seats 
D 0 + L/H being 
implemented 
Serious rank 
& file worker 
resistance to 
L/H 
Sealmaster A 0 0 None Management 
not interested 
in L/H or lean 
production 
Engineered 
Plastic 
Products 
A 0 0 Lean-enough 
production being 
implemented 
Management 
driving 
changes in 
production 
and work 
organization 
Mini OE B 0 + L/H being 
implemented 
 
Aircraft Parts A 0 0 to +, but 
cautious & 
reactive 
Lean-enough 
production being 
implemented 
Plant 
management 
favors more 
extensive L/H 
but corporate 
management 
prefers less 
information-
sharing and 
worker 
involvement 
Key: International union L/H activity at plant=international union’s degree of involvement in actively 
supporting L/H at case study plant. 
         Local union L/H activity at plant=international union’s degree of involvement in actively supporting 
L/H at case study plant. 
         L/H implementation= extent and nature of learning/HPWO or other changes in production methods 
and work organization at case study plant 
         -- =very negative, - =negative, 0 =neutral, + =positive, ++ =very positive 
 
Although the six plants are a small sample and may not be representative of the unionized 
component sector as a whole, the case studies suggest the following hypotheses about the 
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relationships among international unions, local unions, and the implementation of work 
reorganization. 
 
• At the plant level: 
 
o Both the international union and the local union must be actively involved 
in supporting learning/HPWO if it is to be implemented in the most 
thoroughgoing manner. 
 
o If neither the international nor the local actively supports learning/HPWO, 
then management will determine the nature of work reorganization.  
Extensive learning/HPWO is unlikely but “lean enough” production is 
likely, just as in nonunion plants. 
 
o If the local union is actively involved in supporting learning/HPWO but 
the international is not, then learning/HPWO is possible, although it is not 
likely to be is thoroughgoing as it would be if the international were also 
actively involved.40  
 
• At the international union level: 
 
o An international that centralizes its learning/HPWO activity is likely to 
have more widespread and more thoroughgoing adoption of it—and 
higher productivity—in its plants than one that takes a decentralized 
approach to learning/HPWO.  This will create the conditions necessary 
(although not sufficient) to maintain high wages and benefits and to 
maintain or recreate some version of pattern bargaining. 
 
o An international that does not actively support learning/HPWO is likely to 
be making a de facto choice in favor of management-determined work 
reorganization in its plants, making it likelier that lean initiatives will not 
be worker-friendly in design and result.  Learning/HPWO will be 
uncommon in these plants.  Either traditional U.S. work organization or 
“lean enough” production” will prevail in such a union’s plants.  Because 
patterns of work organization will resemble those found in nonunion 
plants, the union’s ability to maintain high wages and benefits will depend 
largely on firms’ ability (and willingness) to find other relatively durable 
sources of competitive advantage.  There will be downward pressure on 
wages and benefits in plants where firms are unable pr unwilling to find 
such sources of competitive advantage.  At the extreme, the international’s 
ability (or desire) to maintain some version of pattern bargaining could be 
compromised or threatened. 
 
                                                 
40 None of our case study plants had an international actively supporting HPWO combined with a local not 
actively supporting it.  In such a situation, the outcome may depend on the extent to which the international 
centralizes control over HPWO and is able to overcome local union reticence or resistance. 
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o An international that actively supports learning/HPWO but implements it 
in a relatively decentralized way is likely to produce work organization, 
productivity, and wage and benefit outcomes that are intermediate 
between the preceding two extremes.  Plant-level work organization, 
productivity, and wage and benefit outcomes will be more varied and 
learning/HPWO (where it exists) less thoroughgoing than in an 
international with a more centralized approach to learning/HPWO, but 
learning/HPWO will be more widespread than in an international that does 
not actively support it.  Variation in plant-level outcomes may threaten 
attempts to maintain or re-create some version of pattern bargaining, but 
cross-plant average levels of productivity, wages, and benefits are likely to 
be higher than in an international that does not actively support 
learning/HPWO. 
 
o International union policy toward learning/HPWO does not necessarily 
translate into corresponding international union practice with respect to 
learning/HPWO.  Internationals that actively support learning/HPWO 
should strive for a consistent set of plant-level support activities. 
 
In sum, if we are right that a substantive-empowerment learning/HPWO version of lean, 
in the context of our “FULL” model, is the best road to firm performance and survival, 
unions at every level – local, regional (e.g., central labor councils), and international – 
need consistent policies and practice to advocate for, train about, and support its 
widespread implementation.  Unions may want to consider having regional “learning lean 
squads” (with a better name!), and/or demand that publicly funded entities such as 
Manufacturing Extension Program (MEP) centers in states with many union plants retain 
union-sensitive specialists using union-backed “FULL” approaches.41  Indeed, such 
squads (or unions’ ability to mobilize low-cost service providers such as MEP centers) 
could begin to make unionized status a competitive advantage for firms.  It should also be 
understood that learning/HPWO lean affects not only the factory but also the office, 
which usually contributes much of the excess lead time that makes many manufacturers 
less-than-ideally responsive to their customers. 
 
Regional Trade Policy 
 
Thus far, we have emphasized the union policies and practices that support the “learning” 
and “lean” aspects of our FULL model.  In this section, we turn to public policies that can 
support “full-utilization.”  
 
Earlier in this paper, we defined the three core regions for component manufacturing: the 
Boston-Philadelphia corridor, the Great Lakes states of the eastern Midwest, and the 
upper part of the Southeast.  We noted that the first of these is relatively diverse in its 
component endowment, while the latter two are heavily concentrated in the web of 
                                                 
41 The perception that MEP centers are not sufficiently union plant-focused is generally a misreading.  Any 
international union, or regional office of such a union, that brought a large number of prospective 
customers to an MEP center could expect to get a delighted reception.  
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sectors tied to “auto” and “equipment.” ”Equipment” is defined to include both 
metalworking machinery and construction, farm, and garden equipment.  Aided by 
additional funding from the Ford Foundation, the AMP team did substantial new research 
for this project to define these two regions with considerable precision, and to understand 
their interaction and their places in the US economy. 
 
We used brute force – detailed examination of employment and gross state product data 
at the state and county level – to determine where the bulk of component manufacturing 
is occurring within the two regions.  This work brought us to construct and commission 
input-output modeling on two precisely defined regions: 
• A Great Lakes region made up of the entire states of Wisconsin, Illinois, Indiana, 
Ohio, and Michigan, supplemented by 20 Iowa counties bordering Illinois, seven 
Missouri counties (essentially metropolitan St. Louis) also bordering Illinois, 
three Kentucky counties (basically, metro Louisville) bordering Indiana, and three 
counties in extreme western New York, bordering the Hamilton-St. Catharines 
industrial corridor in Ontario.  (More of Ontario – especially that corridor plus 
metropolitan Windsor, which borders metro Detroit – belongs in the region; 
however, our modeling service, Regional Economic Models, Inc. (“REMI”), does 
not yet have access to input-output and transportation flow data for Canadian 
provinces at the sub-province level.)   
• An “Upper Southeast Competitor Region,” made up of the entire states of North 
Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, Tennessee, and all but 
three counties of Kentucky.  The states of this region have made a clear push to 
attract new automotive investment, with incentives justified by claims that 
subsidies would be more than repaid by an influx of component manufacturers 
arriving to supply the new greenfield assembly facilities.  In a sense, all seek an 
industry mix with less emphasis on agriculture, textile, and apparel, i.e., one that 
looks more like that of the Great Lakes region.  All but Georgia have landed at 
least one Japan-, Korea-, or Europe-based based auto assembly facility, and many 
have had some success in growing their component supply bases as well.  
 
The Great Lakes region we have defined has lost some of its pre-1979 and pre-1998 
preeminence.42   One way to think about a region’s competitiveness is using a trade 
model: a competitive region exports a lot of its output beyond its borders and, by making 
most of the parts that go into the products it exports, gets to keep within the region most 
of what the world pays for those products.  While the regional definitions are not a 
perfect match to ours, the export performance of the Great Lakes and Upper Southeast 
regions can be roughly gauged using International Trade Administration data for the 
“North Central” (our region, minus Wisconsin and plus Pennsylvania and the rest of New 
York) and “South Atlantic” (including our Tennessee, the Carolinas, and Alabama, but 
                                                 
42 As we have noted, 1979 is a watershed year.  In most durable manufacturing industries, 1978 was the 
peak output and market share year for domestic production.  Most onshore plants suffered from 1979 
through 1986, when the plunge in the dollar brought a period of relative stability until the so-called Asian 
financial crisis of 1998 caused the decline to resume with a vengeance.  The recessions of 1980-82 and 
1990-92 hid the secular nature of the slide, as did as the apparent stability of the 1983-89 and 1993-98 
recoveries. 
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minus Georgia, Mississippi, and the rest of Kentucky, and plus Virginia) regions.  
Figures 18-19 show exports beyond the US, Canada, and Mexico for the auto and 
equipment sectors.  We exclude Canada and Mexico from exports because of the 
dominant role of intra-company trade, especially in automotive. 
Figure 18. Auto Exports,
excluding US, Canada, & Mexico
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Source: International Trade Administration 
 
In auto, the North Central region’s beyond-NAFTA exports rose just nine percent 
between 1999 and 2004, from $11.8 to $12.9 billion; the entire increase, and more, can be 
explained by exports of Ohio-made Honda cars and minivans.  In the South Atlantic, auto 
exports rose 108 percent, from $6.7 billion to $13.9 billion, powered of course by exports 
of Kentucky-made Toyotas and Tennessee-made Nissans.  As we will understand better 
when soon we turn to inter-regional trade in auto parts, however, exports of finished 
vehicles are only about half of the five-year increase: exports of southeast-made auto 
parts into the Great Lakes states fully account for the other half. 
Figure 19. Equipment Exports,
excluding US, Canada, & Mexico
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Source: International Trade Administration 
 
In equipment, both regions have enjoyed solid beyond-NAFTA export growth: North 
Central’s equipment exports rose 36 percent from $12.1 to $16.4 billion, while South 
Atlantic’s rose 42 percent from $5.6 to $7.9 billion.  But these figures disguise important 
subregional detail: about half of the $4.3-billion increase for North Central came from 
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Caterpillar construction equipment exports (Illinois) – with each piece of equipment 
embodying about 15 percent lower US-Canada content than a decade ago, according to 
its 10K filings with the SEC, or from exports from parts of New York not included in our 
definition of the Great Lakes region.   
 
It is also worth noting that the competition is not just between like places in the two 
regions.  In the Great Lakes region, the vast majority of manufacturing occurs in 
metropolitan areas.  While we have not done the research to confirm this, abundant trade 
press reports suggest that a large proportion of auto parts and equipment plants in the 
upper Southeast are located in rural areas.  The notion that relative manufacturing wages 
in the upper southeast lag behind, but will soon catch up to, those of its competitor region 
to the north is thus belied by the fact that much of the basis for the southeast’s 
manufacturing attraction strategy plays on investors’ post-1970s antipathy to certain 
features of northern urbanism (especially their high pay, blacks, and unions).  It is thus 
not surprising that the southeast has done much less well attracting the design and 
technical sales centers of large manufacturing companies, which depend on the skills 
(and hence good wages) found almost exclusively in metropolitan areas. 
 
Our sponsors, as well as the policy audience we hope to attract, may wonder why a 
particular region should be favored.  There is a strong case for focusing our favored 
upgrading strategy in the sector’s densest, highest-wage, and most-unionized location.  
We also admit to an underlying bias toward regional specialization, as readers will see in 
the trade model we present near the end of the paper. 
• Regional specialization surely reflects some aspects of comparative advantage. 
• Leaving states and regions entirely free to raid indiscriminately other regions’ 
specialties distorts comparative advantage by shifting the basis of competition 
from true factor endowments to wage and benefit levels.  If there were federal 
floors, surely they would block a region’s attempts to compete away other 
regions’ assets by promising lower standards. 
• We read economic history as offering few compelling cases in which regions 
achieved prosperity by a smokestack-raiding approach.43   
• It is arguably inefficient for states to induce investments than merely duplicate 
capacity recently put in place elsewhere.   
• To the extent that regional competition based on wages reduces the effectiveness 
of unions, gains in the regions that get more investment and employment may be 
dwarfed by losses in other regions. 
 
The Great Lakes region clearly remains an unequalled regional powerhouse.  According 
to BEA data compiled by the Northeast-Midwest Institute, manufacturing accounted for 
18.8 percent of gross state product (GSP) in 2003 in the “Midwest” (our region, plus 
                                                 
43 According to Bureau of Labor Statistics National Compensation Survey data, the average blue-collar 
straight-time hourly wage in the East South Central Census region increased 28% from $11.21 in 1997 to 
$14.36 in 2004.  In the East North Central Census region, the increase was 22%, from $15.15 to $17.97.  
While the difference – which amounts to roughly 23 cents per hour – appears to belie our contention, we 
suspect that much of the East South Central’s larger average “wage gain” reflects the disappearance of fully 
half of its largest (and generally low-wage) sector -- textiles and apparel -- during the period.  
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Minnesota and the rest of Iowa, but minus metro Louisville and metro Buffalo), versus 
12.8 percent for the US as a whole.44  Looking at component sector employment at the 
Congressional district level as of 2004, the states of Wisconsin, Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, 
and Michigan were home to 9 of the 10 largest, 15 of the 20 largest, 24 of the 30 largest, 
and 31 of the 50 largest-component sector employment districts. 
 
One leg of the regional competitiveness stool is exporting core products that fetch good 
prices.  This brings other regions’ and nations’ income into a region.  Figures 20-21, 
based on REMI runs done for this project, show the Great Lakes region’s exports of 
manufactures in the auto and equipment sector.  (An important data note: auto exports in 
Figure 20 are limited to parts, as they should be.  Equipment exports include exports of 
finished graders, cranes, tractors, etc. and so give a somewhat distorted view of 
components trade.  Unfortunately, input-output-based trade data for the sector do not 
allow parts to be broken out separately because finished equipment and their components 
are often in the same NAICS code.) 
 
Figure 20. Auto Parts Exports 
 
 
Source for figures 20-23: Custom runs by Regional Economic Models, Inc. (REMI) 
 
 
                                                 
44 Despite sharp losses for the Carolinas in textiles and apparel, the region defined as Kentucky, Tennessee, 
the Carolinas, Georgia, Alabama, and Mississippi gained enough in auto and (to a lesser extent) equipment 
to hold manufacturing’s weight in gross state product at 17% of GSP between 1993 and 2003.   For the 
Midwest, manufacturing’s weight in GSP fell from 20.2% in 1993 to 18.8% in 2003.  
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Figure 21. Equipment Exports 
 
 
In 2004, the Great Lakes region produced a total of $152 billion worth of components in 
the motor vehicle sector.  (All figures in this REMI-based analysis are in constant dollars 
of 2000.)  Of this $152 billion, just under $81 billion, or approximately 53 percent, of this 
output is consumed by in-region firms, i.e., $71 billion – or 47 percent -- is exported 
beyond the region.  Exporting is even more critical for the equipment sector.  Out of the 
total $91 billion in output, $30 billion (or 33 percent) is consumed by firms within the 
region; two-thirds is exported out of the region. As we have noted, a competitive region 
is not just an export powerhouse; the products it exports must have high in-region 
content.  We have established that the Great Lakes region is a major exporter in auto and 
equipment.  We turn now to the region’s imports.   
 
Figure 22. Auto Parts Imports 
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Figure 23. Equipment Imports 
 
 
Figures 22-23 show that manufacturers in the Great Lakes region (as we have defined it) 
consume $128 billion of auto parts and $56 billion of equipment.  But, as noted in the 
previous paragraph, the region self-supplies only $81 billion of auto and $30 billion of 
equipment.  That means that the Great Lakes region imports from beyond its borders 
$47.5 billion in auto parts and $26 billion in equipment.45  Based on comparing County 
Business Patterns and the Commerce Department’s International Trade Administration 
data for 1997, these 2004 figures -- calculated from runs commissioned for this project 
from REMI -- are up at least 50 percent from 1997. 
 
What do $47.5 billion in auto components imports and $26 billion in equipment imports 
– or a total of $73.5 billion that “leaks out” from the Great Lakes region’s demand – 
really mean?  To make it clear, let’s do some simple math.  Manufacturing is 15 percent 
of a $12 trillion US economy.46  That’s $1.8 trillion.  Dividing that by the 14.2 million 
people employed in the sector, we get $127,000 per employee.  So, roughly speaking, if 
the Great Lakes region made rather than imported $73.5 billion, it could have about $73.5 
billion / $127,000 = 578,000 more jobs in auto parts and equipment.  Because the region 
pays better than the manufacturing average, perhaps a figure like 450,000 would be more 
realistic.  And those are just the jobs in those two sectors.  The region has a 
manufacturing multiplier effect of roughly three, according to the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis; so its “import leakage” really represents something like 1.3 million jobs.  If 
$73.5 billion in imports means 1.3 million jobs, then every marginal $1 billion that the 
region can move from import to self-supplied translates into about 18,000 jobs.  If each 
of those jobs pays $40,000 and if the region can capture even 10 percent of that amount 
                                                 
45 Appendix 6 presents maps showing trade flows among the individual states of the Great Lakes region, 
documenting precisely how interdependent each dyad of states is in each of the two key component sectors 
– auto parts and equipment. 
46 Ideally, we would do the analysis on auto parts and equipment, but data on auto’s weight in GDP do not 
consistently break out parts from vehicles, and our definition of the “equipment” sector is too idiosyncratic 
to match up to federal data. 
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in sales, excise, and income taxes, then any annual expenditure up to $72 million can be 
justified as a fair price for inducing $1 billion more in-region self-supply.   
 
Note that we are not advocating autarky.  There are gains to trade as well as “leakages.”  
We believe that leakages are likely to be larger and the gains from imports lower when a 
high-wage region has large multipliers in its key industries, and when more and more of 
its imports in those industries come from countries or regions that compete on wages 
rather than on comparative advantage rooted in the quality of its labor, land, and capital. 
 
 For the Great Lakes region to remain a competitive powerhouse, it will either have to 
sharply increase its exports of auto and equipment – and, while doing so, stem the 
accelerating level on out-of-region content in those products -- and/or engage in what 
economists call “import substitution” and start to make some of the $73.5 billion it 
imports to supply its key export sectors.47    
  
That’s where our strategy comes in, and where the states in the Great Lakes region need 
to play a large and catalytic role.  First, they must understand that they are part of a 
common competitive region.48  They each live and die, though of course to different 
degrees, on how well the auto and equipment sectors export and how much they source 
their components within the region.  No facile talk about diversification, high-tech, or the 
service economy can change this fact.  In nearly every state in the region, these two 
sectors alone are at least 20 percent of manufacturing employment.49  More important, 
the output of these sectors plays an even larger role in these states’ exports – the way they 
get income from beyond their borders.  Farm and construction equipment dominate 
Illinois’ and Wisconsin’s out-of-state shipments, while auto parts dominate Michigan’s, 
Indiana’s, and – to a lesser extent – Ohio’s (see Appendix 6). 
 
The companies that make up these core sectors make no distinction between Indianapolis 
and Louisville, Detroit and Toledo, Milwaukee and Chicago, St. Louis and Peoria, or 
Cleveland and Buffalo.  Appendix 6 presents all of the trade flows in the two core sectors 
among the states of our Great Lakes region (remember: our “Illinois” contains metro St. 
Louis and 21 Iowa edge counties, and our “Indiana” includes the three counties that make 
up metro Louisville), and between those states and three competitor regions: (1) the upper 
southeast, (2) the rest of the US, and (3) the rest of the world.  We can use a simple 
example to demonstrate the need for states to understand their economic region and its 
interests, and to craft cross-state policies to help the region out-compete other regions.  A 
                                                 
47 Gomory and Baumol (2000) show that higher-wage nations’ ideal trading partners have wages of 25%-
50% of their levels.  But when the competitors’ wages get closer, the regions shift from being just trading 
partners to being competitors.  We believe that this analysis also applies to a high-wage region like the 
Great Lakes vis-à-vis the mid-wage upper Southeast.  See R.E. Gomory and W.J. Baumol, Global Trade 
and Conflicting National Interest (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2000). 
48 The precise shape of the true industrial region varies by industry.  Were we considering auto parts only, 
Illinois might well not quite make the cut.  However, Illinois dominates the equipment sector, in which 
Ohio and Western New York are much smaller players. 
49 The two sectors as a proportion of total manufacturing employment range from 19.6% (Illinois) to 35.6% 
(Michigan), with the other three in-region states clustered tightly around 21% -- Wisconsin 20.9%, Indiana 
21.3%, Ohio 21.5%. 
 68
Michigan automaker or auto supplier is considering sourcing $10 million worth of a 
component either in Michigan, to a supplier elsewhere in our Great Lakes region, to a 
location in the upper southeast competitor region, or to China.  (We assume for purposes 
of exposition that each company is a representative slice of our sector-level statistics.)   
 
Obviously, for any given state, winning the order for an in-state supplier is the best 
outcome.  For starters, the typical manufactured component is about 35 percent value-
added (on-site labor and overhead) and 65 percent purchased components.  Thus an in-
state source starts with $3.5 million of the $10 million.  Based on the trade flow data, 
Table 8 below shows that – if the order is sourced to an out-of-state supplier -- it still 
makes a big difference where that supplier is located.  Table 8, which views the 
calculation from the standpoint of one state in the Great Lakes region, Michigan, makes 
clear that plants in many in-region locations – notably Ohio and Wisconsin – source back 
to Michigan a large proportion of their total purchases. 
 
Table 8.  Michigan Proportion of Purchased Component Value 
 
If $10-million Order is Sourced to:  Predicted Michigan Purchases Value 
is: 
Michigan     $3,704,000 
Ohio        1,687,000 
Wisconsin       1,647,000 
Indiana (incl. metro Louisville)    1,541,000 
Illinois (incl. Iowa edge & metro St. Louis)   1,455,000 
Upper SE         1,072,000 
Upper SE net of GM/Delphi & Ford/Visteon      803,000 
Offshore          161,000       
   
Source: REMI data applied to $6.5-million in purchased content 
 
In fact, Table 8 almost certainly understates the Upper Great Lakes region’s marginal 
propensity to buy in Michigan, while exaggerating other regions’ propensity to shop 
there.  REMI data tell us that the upper southeast buys more than 12.5 percent of its 
manufactured automotive parts from Michigan, but this figure includes massive exports 
of GM engines, transmissions, axles, and stampings to its assembly plants in Lakewood, 
GA and Spring Hill, TN and of other components to its electrical-parts plants in Athens 
and Tuscaloosa, AL and Meridien and Laurel, MS.  Just pulling out $3,000 per vehicle in 
GM/Delphi supply to the Atlanta and Spring Hill plants reduces the Upper Southeast’s 
entry in Table 8 above to 908,000.  Doing the same for comparable “captive supply” by 
Ford/Visteon supplying Ford’s Atlanta assembly plant and the number drops to 803,000, 
or less than half the average for the Great Lakes.  In other words, if the $10-million order 
is not going to be sourced in Michigan, it is twice as good for Michigan if it goes to 
Sheboygan (WI) than if it goes to Shelbyville (TN), and 10 times better than if it goes to 
Shanghai. 
 
For the Great Lakes region as a whole, the essential argument to grasp is this.  In a 
country in which less than 13 percent of the jobs and 15 percent of the personal income is 
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in manufacturing, the region owes 20 percent of its job and 30 percent of its personal 
income to the sector.  Within that sector, it is uniquely focused in two subsectors – auto 
and equipment – in which traded products (vehicles and machinery) are heavily 
composed of components made under medium- to high-skill conditions.  An adjoining 
region has played on lower rural labor costs – and on the political advantage to Japan-
based automakers to locate assembly plants in states not dominated by US competitors in 
their industries – to make a move into these two industries, starting with assembly plants 
but increasingly in components as well.  Thirty years into this regional competition, the 
Great Lakes region still leads in its ability to supply itself in these sectors, but its lead is 
eroding.  Figures 24-25 below show each region’s share of employment in the component 
SICs of the two sectors, based on County Business Patterns (1979, 1989) and our REMI 
runs for 2004. 
 
Figure 24. Self-Supply in Auto, 1979, 1989, and 2004 
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Sources for Figures 24-25: County Business Patterns (1979, 1989), REMI (2004) 
 
 
Figure 25. Self-Supply in Equipment, 1979, 1989, and 2004 
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While both regions have, in recent years, lost some self-supply to imports from outside 
the US, for the Great Lakes region the upper southeast’s gain in self-supply has been just 
as important.  Needless to say, concerted action by the Great Lakes region to counter the 
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rise of the upper southeast in the components that go into its largest export products 
makes strong economic sense.  And with the high level of interdependence among the 
Great Lakes states in their core sectors’ supply chains, replacing intra-regional 
competition with inter-state cooperation against the rest of the world is the obvious policy 
in a period of constrained public resources.  Obviously, this task would be far easier for 
Great Lakes state legislators if there were national trade policies that made offshoring 
more difficult or less attractive, and/or that limited competition among the states.  But 
there are not, nor are there likely to be in the future.  While the recent fight over CAFTA 
shows that there are Republicans and Democrats alike with grave doubts about giving the 
multinationals a free ride, the leadership of both parties remains committed to proving 
that their parties are thoroughly business-friendly. 
 
So where are we?  Nearly every state in the Great Lakes region has a large structural 
fiscal deficit, which in some states has led, or may soon lead, to cuts in important 
services.  A combination of political constraints and – relative to Pennsylvania and 
Virginia, where Democratic governors got taxes through Republican legislatures – undue 
political timidity have combined to “rule out” tax increases.  Just as bad, this fiscal 
distress is invoked as a reason that little can be done to address economic development.   
 
In fact, scarcer public resources present an opportunity to move from a costly 
“entitlements” system of business incentives to a more targeted, pay-only-for-what-you-
get approach.  As the work just described makes clear, incentives should be focused on 
higher-wage manufacturers that do substantial purchasing within the region.  We also 
contend that the most efficient form of such incentives is the direct provision of services. 
This is better policy because it avoids redundancy and firm moral hazard in state 
supports, ensures greater accountability and quality control in state expenditures, and is 
more likely to be fiscally self-sustaining through resulting increases in in-state human 
capital and incomes. The services we have in mind include training on technical and 
work organization improvement, as well as consulting on the elements of the lean toolkit 
and on more active customer management to migrate away from the most price-competed 
products and markets. Rather than paying firms to do what they might already have done, 
using resources to pay for training or consulting directly tied to upgrading puts the money 
squarely on the problem.  And, to the extent that the content of the services is an 
investment in people, the resulting skills are likely to remain within the state and region 
even if the advantaged firm exits in the future. 
 
While direct service support is best, we recognize that state tax incentives are not going 
away any time soon.  With regard to such incentives, the obvious play is to withdraw 
subsidies from sectors with small multiplier effects (including, in the Great Lakes region, 
insurance, finance, and retail development) and to switch them to sectors with much 
larger ones and, within those sectors, to firms paying high wages and doing most of their 
purchasing within the region.   
 
The politics play less obviously.  The region is dominated by relatively junior Democratic 
governors facing off against Republican legislative majorities that favor across-the-board 
business tax cuts.  Despite their differences, in the Great Lakes region both the Governors 
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and the state legislators badly need a stabilized manufacturing sector.  Moreover, they 
have access to an impressive array of tools for helping their manufacturing sectors, 
including but not limited to: 
• Requiring that the manufacturers that earn targeted subsidies agree to be 
benchmarked and, where performance deficits are uncovered, be sent to the front 
of the line for direct technical assistance services from programs (such as MEP 
centers) in which the states are co-investors 
• Assembling groups of manufacturers for larger-pool health insurance purchasing50 
• Encouraging health care coverage or contributions to a state fund for the 
uninsured (lest the State end up covering those costs via Medicaid)51 
• Raising state minimum wage floors52 
• Tying incentives to wage, export-from-the-region and, especially, in-region 
purchasing behavior. 
None of these initiatives requires federal action,53 and while all are better and more safely 
done politically on a multi-state basis, each can be pursued at the own-state level, often 
by fiat or regulatory rule-making rather than requiring a vote of the legislature.   
 
Within manufacturing, the same math should hold: no more pork for every plant in the 
right NAICS code, but targeted relief to the subset of manufacturers whose behaviors 
promise their state, and their region, the highest return.  (According to one close observer, 
just under three in 10 Great Lakes manufacturers are, or are approaching, “world-class.”  
But one-third to one-half are not even improving in critical areas, e.g., 33 percent 
reported no reduction in lead times between 2001 and 2004, and 53 percent reported no 
                                                 
50 Recall our discussion of the union-nonunion gap in health insurance coverage.  Were insurance costs to 
drop, union would be in a better position to begin restoring their pay premium. 
51 Making provision of health insurance a condition of favored state treatment may raise questions under 
the commerce clause.  Although ERISA preempts states from requiring health insurance as an employment 
benefit, it does not appear to bar them from enacting a tax on employers dedicated to achieving the same 
purpose and giving employers credit for coverage of their own employees’ health care costs.  Such a tax 
can distinguish employers by size, critical function, or other indicia. For example, in the Health Care for 
All plan under consideration in Maryland, all employers must make a “fair share” contribution – currently 
set at 4.5 percent of payroll for small employers and eight percent for large ones – toward health care costs. 
The contribution can be offset by employer coverage of health care costs, or deposited into a fund for the 
uninsured. Individuals and families are also free to join a small-group health insurance consortium, a quasi-
public insurer, which gives them group buying power. Unfortunately from our perspective, the Maryland 
plan ties employers’ contribution levels to payroll. This sends the wrong market signal on wages, 
effectively punishing employers who pay better. But this defect can certainly be remedied. What is 
important is that ERISA does not, for a competent legislature, appear to preclude state action directed at 
employers with the goal of extending the reach of health insurance, a fortiori giving favored treatment to 
employers that do so voluntarily.  
52 Only Illinois among the 13 states with minimums above the federal $5.15 floor is in the Great Lakes 
region; see Business Week, Nov. 29, 2004, page 70.  We recognize that most manufacturers pay well above 
the federal minimum.  But achieving the full utilization of equipment that our “FULL” recipe requires may 
make it necessary for better companies to take on some low-end work to cover fixed costs.  If it is in the 
region’s interest to have these better companies succeed, then logically it should not permit their 
competitors to offer wages below those that state legislatures require in 13 states.   
53 Obviously, federal policy changes with regard to trade, prescription drug pricing and importation, and 
Medicaid federalization would also be welcome. 
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increase in inventory turns.54)  This is not the same thing as “picking winners” – which 
no one knows how to get right – but, rather, paying for performance.  States already have 
criteria for certain programs (e.g to qualify for tax relief under the Michigan Economic 
Growth Act’s high-tech program, a firm must spend at least a minimum proportion of 
sales on qualifying R&D and pay an average wage of at least three times the federal 
minimum. 
 
Paying for performance must include economic development policy that speaks directly 
to the region’s continuing reduction in self-supply.  It is unconscionable that most, if not 
all, of the Great Lakes states routinely shovel tax breaks and training subsidies to large 
firms, imposing nary a quid pro quo on where they source the parts than go into their 
products.  Imagine, going forward, that every Great Lakes governor were to make such 
incentives more generous but only for stable or rising in-region purchasing content.  
While doing this at the level of a state – e.g., Wisconsin tying its incentive to X% in-
Wisconsin purchasing – might be viewed as business-unfriendly, doing it at the regional 
level would (as we demonstrated) be almost as effective and substantially less 
constraining for the affected firm. 
 
Attaching sensible regional quid pro quos to state largesse also has a political payoff.  
Existing firms are rightly incensed to see their tax dollars go to attract and subsidize 
companies – some of whom may be their competitors – that have no track record of 
providing jobs or tax base in their state or region.  Governors and legislatures should be 
able to tell those longtime employers that they will benefit from the additional purchases 
that the new entrants will make – and be able to say that not as a wishful prediction but as 
a statement of fact: unless they buy more, they will not get your tax money or anyone 
else’s. 
 
Preemption Concerns Overblown 
 
Governors and legislators often fear better stewardship of incentives for a newer reason – 
the fear that even reasonable quid pro quos will be judged anti-competitive under the 
emerging legal regime. One such concern has been heightened in recent years by a Sixth 
Circuit decision -- recently accepted for review by the US Supreme Court -- regarding 
Ohio’s use of income tax credits to spur DaimlerChrysler’s investment to retool its 
Toledo Jeep facility.55 The other broad area of concern is the provisions of post-1994 
WTO and other agreements (in the US case, particularly NAFTA and the recent CAFTA) 
as they relate to the rights of signatory nations and their constituent “federated elements” 
(in the US case, states). NAFTA and CAFTA in particular restrict state government 
regulation, taxation, purchasing, and economic development policies that are regarded as 
non-tariff barriers to trade.  
 
We have reviewed the key case law on these questions of federal and international 
preemption.  We conclude that states’ fears of encroachment on their traditional 
                                                 
54 See “World-Class Profit Factors: Positioning Great Lakes Manufacturing in the Global Economy,” 
presentation of John Brandt, The MPI Group, Detroit, March 4, 2005. 
55 Cuno v. DaimlerChrysler, Inc., 386 F.3d 738 (6th Cir. 2004).  
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sovereignty are understandable and justified, but that none of this developing law thwarts 
the design and implementation of the policies proposed here. On its face, Cuno only 
forbids income tax credits for businesses with prior presence in the state offering those 
credits. It affects no other use of tax incentives (indeed, it explicitly exempts the use of 
property tax-based incentives), and does not touch non-tax subsidies or direct cash grants 
of any kind. States wishing to produce the same results as Ohio did with its offending 
scheme in Cuno will thus easily be able to reach those results by other means.56
 
International trade agreements do threaten distinctive environmental or social regulation 
in states, but their effects on narrow economic development efforts are negligible. 
Nothing in the WTO prevents states from making vigorous attempts to grow their local 
value-added, to induce more regional coherence in their provision of in-kind development 
supports, to defend their existing tax bases by requiring that all firms operating within 
them assume their fair share of internationally common social standards, and to support 
such policies through state programs encouraging them. So long as, as in our suggestions, 
the particular encouragement is available to any company, wherever headquartered and 
wherever now doing business, that engages in the advantaged behavior, the legal case 
against those incentives is extremely weak on its merits, and in any case unlikely to be 
brought.57
 
Remember that our preferred approach for how states and regions should encourage the 
upgrading of firms with qualifying behaviors is by writing down the cost of high-quality 
direct services. This is both good policy and most clearly insulated from preemption 
concerns.  In terms both of national and international law, in funding or providing such  
 
New Associations: Organizing the Beneficiaries of Better Policy 
 
Manufacturers have been among their own worst enemies in the 25-year skid in Great 
Lakes (not to mention national) manufacturing performance.  The story we tell of 
manufacturing is not well known, and the conclusions for policy —quite different for 
firms pursuing our “FULL” recipe than for others — are not generally appreciated by the 
domestic firms and workers that public policy should serve. Business and trade 
associations tend naturally to construct their policy agendas from positions on which all 
members agree, accepting differences in strength of agreement, rather than from 
segmented pursuit of the interests of what are, after all, competing firms. Comparatively 
                                                 
56 The doctrinal distinction drawn in Cuno between income tax incentives for firms with in-state presence 
and all other firms or incentive schemes for business location or expansion is thus vastly under-inclusive in 
preventing corporate whipsawing of states. But it is equally over-inclusive, potentially barring any change 
in state income tax law that advantages corporations with existing state presence. For these reasons, we 
consider it a bad reading of the Commerce Clause and bad policy for a new federalism. We think it unlikely 
to survive without at least partial reversal at the Supreme Court.  
  
57 A simple political way of thinking through the international law is this. In comparative terms, US 
programs in “industrial policy” are famously immature. Until states in the US begin to approach the sorts of 
state interventions routine in other advanced industrialized economies, they should not worry. And as they 
do approach that level, they will come to join any number of powerful nations that can be expected to resist 
WTO lowering of it.   
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speaking, and owing to the relatively weakness of labor in the US, there is also an 
unnatural degree of policy cohesion in the American business community, which further 
encourages suppression of differences in interest within it.58   
 
Thus, even though the interests of high-productivity firms paying high wages and making 
large investments in training and new equipment are quite different from those of firms 
paying low wages and often investing far less in human or physical capital, they behave 
politically as if their interests were the same.  
 
So long as this state of affairs continues, it will be impossible to get adequate business 
support for policies promoting high-productivity manufacturers, at least to the extent 
those policies pose any risk to their low-productivity colleagues. The fiscally rattled 
governors and legislatures of Great Lakes states desperately need higher-performing 
businesses – and, ideally, powerful associations representing them – to weigh in on the 
side of better, more targeted policy.  As daunting as this prospect may seem, it is essential 
if higher-performing manufacturing is to have any serious chance of getting itself 
established as the norm, not the exception, in US manufacturing. Higher wage, benefit, 
environmental, product quality, and other standards are needed to clear out (not save) 
low-wage competition and to provide clearer rewards for higher-productivity firms. 
 
Public policy also can and should support the “lean” aspect of the FULL recipe.  In that 
context, we recommend direct technical support and other assistance to firms pursuing 
lean manufacturing as an element of the recipe.  There is intriguing, though not 
unambiguous, evidence to suggest that such support is ideally organized regionally59 in 
order to maximize inter-firm learning among companies facing common market 
conditions.60 We also know that a typical MEP “treatment” of a firm yields a 3.4-16 
                                                 
58 It is a good sign that, in recent years, a small manufacturer axis has emerged as a counterpoint to NAM’s 
pro-free trade member multinationals.  Beyond the split in NAM, there are other associations and coalitions 
of associations – notably USBIC and NEOCAM – that are playing a commendable role in pointing out the 
insanity of saving manufacturing in “a race to the bottom.” Alas, too many high-performing manufacturers 
don’t make the leap from opposing the multinationals’ trade agenda to the need to oppose their closely 
linked “deregulatory” agenda.  With many of the better-performing small manufacturers being located in 
the Great Lakes region, the best prospect for a new associationism rooted in self-interest rather than 
putative class solidarity is probably in the regional caucuses of national trade associations.  COWS and the 
MMTC are considering seeking foundation support to convene a council of high performers in which to vet 
the issue and, if enough companies risk membership, actually trying to launch a new group. 
 
59 We have no hard-and-fast concept of region, but would note that a natural economic region could be as 
small as an industry-dense area in a city, or as large as a five-state area.  It is a more or less contiguous 
area, independent of state or metropolitan area political boundaries, that has a high concentration of 
employment and output in one or more sectors, and a large amount of internal trade in those sectors relative 
to its external trade. 
60 See, among others, S.J. Appold “Agglomeration, Interorganizational Networks, and Competitive 
Performance in the U.S. Metalworking Sector,” Economic Geography, 71:1 (1995), pp. 27-54; P. Beeson, 
“Total Factor Productivity Growth and Agglomeration Economies in Manufacturing,” Journal of Regional 
Science, 27:2 (1987), pp. 183-99; L. Dresser and J. Rogers, ” Networks, Sectors, and Workforce Learning,” 
in R. P. Giloth, Jobs and Economic Development: Strategies and Practices (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 1998), 
pp. 64-82; J.H. Fagan, “Do Northeast Ohio's Drivers Derive Competitive Advantage from Shared Labor?,” 
Economic Development Quarterly, 14:1 (2000), pp. 111-125; Meric S. Gertler, “‘Being There’: Proximity, 
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percent productivity boost,61 and we know from recent MMTC work that something on 
the order of a 15 percent increase in average productivity is what is needed to “catch” the 
Chinese competition now decimating component manufacturing in the Midwest.62  An 
attractive project might be to concentrate MEP resources to produce that 15 percent hike 
in a large number of high-wage, rising-productivity firms in the region — in effect, a 
demonstration of scaled targeting of high-end assistance and its possible effects — and 
then document the consequences.  This is, in any case, a better use of MEP resources than 
having them invest time in trying to keep “bottom-feeders” afloat. 
 
A second regional direct-assistance initiative would be to systematically expand business 
consortia (such asthe Wisconsin Regional Training Partnership [WRTP] and the 
Wisconsin Manufacturers Development Consortium [WMDC]) dedicated to supplier 
upgrading, modernization, and the like. For fiscally strapped states, this can be done 
relatively cheaply, and has proven positive effects on performance.  Northeast Ohio 
already has a promising young WRTP-like entity (though with much weaker ties to labor) 
that could be the nucleus of that state’s play in such a project.  These consortia will need 
to be organized with some sensitivity to local conditions.  In Wisconsin, the WRTP and 
WMDC benefit enormously by having OEMs and many of their suppliers headquartered 
within the state.  The same thing is true, though to a lesser (and declining) extent in both 
Michigan (in auto parts) and Illinois (in equipment parts).  It is much less the case in 
Ohio and Indiana. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Organization, and Culture in the Development and Adoption of Advanced Manufacturing Technologies,” 
Economic Geography, 71:1 (1995), pp. 1-26; Ben Harrison, M. R. Kelley, et al, “Innovative Firm Behavior 
and Local Milieu: Exploring the Intersection of Agglomeration, Firm Effects, and Technological Change,” 
Economic Geography 72:3 (1996), pp. 233-258; E.W. Hilland J. F. Brennan,  “A Methodology for 
Identifying the Drivers of Industrial Clusters: The Foundation of Regional Competitive Advantage,” 
Economic Development Quarterly, 14:1 (2000), pp. 65-96; D. Luria and J. Rogers, Metro Futures: 
Economic Solutions for Cities and Their Suburbs (Boston: Beacon Press, 1999); National Governors 
Association, A Governor's Guide to Cluster-Based Economic Development, 2002; E. Parker and J. Rogers, 
”Sectoral Training Initiatives in the US: Building Blocks of a New Workforce Preparation System?,” in P. 
Culpepper, The German Skills Machine: Sustaining Comparative Advantage in a Global Economy (New 
York: Berghahn Books, 1999), pp. 326-362; Michael E. Porter, “Location, Competition, and Economic 
Development: Local Clusters in a Global Economy,” in Economic Development Quarterly, 14:1 (2000), pp. 
15-34; M.J. Waits, “The Added Value of the Industrial Cluster Approach to Economic Analysis, Strategy 
Development, and Service Delivery,” Economic Development Quarterly, 14:1 (2000), pp. 35-50; and 
Jonathon Zeitlin, “Industrial Districts and Local Economic Regeneration: Overview and Comment,” in 
Frank Pyke and Werner Sengenberger, Industrial Districts and Local Economic Regeneration (Geneva: 
International Labour Organization, 1992), pp. 279-94.. 
 
61 See Ron Jarmin, “Evaluating the Impact of Manufacturing Extension on Productivity Growth,” Journal 
of Policy Analysis and Management, 18:1 (1999), and unpublished work by consultants Nexus & 
Associates that updates and extends Jarmin’s methods for Pennsylvania MEP clients.  See “Program 
evaluation of Pennsylvania's Industrial Resource Centers” at www.nexus-associates.com/Publications. 
62 Work on the tool, die, and mold industry performed by MMTC’s PBS for the State of Michigan suggests 
that, when extra “overhead” costs such as travel, inventory financing, shipping, duty, expediting, and the 
onshore repair of offshore products are included, the vaunted 30-40% cost advantage of low-wage 
producers is typically reduced to the 7-25% range, with a median of about 15%.  Some may object that 
offshore producers are also improving, but for China at least, the MPI study cited in footnote 54 suggests 
that only 40% of manufacturers there reduced costs between 2001 and 2004. 
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A useful demonstration project involving more than one contiguous state could map the 
consortia needed and begin to take them to scale.  Promising staff ties among new 
governors in a number of fiscally stressed Great Lakes states may make this a propitious 
moment to move either the MEP-centered “catch China’s costs” or consortial supplier 
upgrading demonstration projects. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Onshore manufacturing’s weight in the economy may well shrink, perhaps sharply, in the 
years and decades ahead.  The sector’s size and, at least as important, its contribution to 
the economy will not be accidental outcomes: they can be influenced by actions that 
companies, unions, and governments take.  We believe that, even in these trying times for 
the sector, there is a way forward for better companies. 
 
We have presented a new model that ties employee authority, lean production, and 
region-favoring purchasing policy.  We argue that this model can help willing and 
capable manufacturers remain profitable paying family-supporting wages in the US.  We 
have proposed incentives policies and demonstration projects that arguably 
couldimplement the model at a cost well below the price tag of today’s costly, untargeted 
state tax expenditure approach.63
 
 
***** 
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63 While many observers (including some economic development professionals) regret the practice of 
offering such tax breaks, most are not aware that their cumulative cost runs into the billions of dollars 
annually.  See, among others, Greg LeRoy, The Great American Jobs Scam: Corporate Tax-Dodging and 
the Myth of Job Creation  (Williston, VT: Berrett-Koehler, 2005).  
 77
Appendix 1. US Manufacturing SICs, as Sorted by AMP Researchers 
(blue shading indicates treated as part of components sector for this study) 
 
2-Digit(s) Materials Services 
Components, 
including 
Tooling  
Finished 
Goods 
Capital Goods, 
excluding 
Tooling 
      2011 thru 2038   
    2041, 2046 
2043-44-45, 
2047, 2048   Food 
207, 2097     
205, 206, 208, 
209 excl. 2097   
Tobacco     214 211 thru 213   
    
221 thru 224, 
226, 228, 229 
2391 thru 2394, 
2399   
      225, 227   
Textiles & 
Apparel 
    2395 thru 2397 23 excl 239   
241-242, 2435 
thru 2439, 2491, 
2493   2431, 2441, 2448
2434, 2449, 
245, 2499   
Wood 
Products & 
Furniture 
     25   
Paper & Pulp 261 thru 263, 
2671-72   265, 2673-74 2675 thru 2679   
Printing   2791 2789, 2796 27 excl 279   
281-282, 2841-2-
3, 285 thru 289     283, 2844   Chemicals 
29        
    3011 302   
    305     
    3061 3069   
3081-82-83   3084, 3089 3085-86, 3088   
Rubber & 
Plastic 
Products 
3087         
Leather     311, 313 314 thru 319   
321, 324, 325, 
327, 329     322-323   Stone, Clay, & Glass 
    3264, 328 326 excl 3264   
331 excl 3315 & 
3317, 333, 334, 
335, 3399    3315, 3317     
    332     
  3398 336     
Primary 
Metals 
    341, 3432     
    3441-42-43-44 
342, 343 excl 
3432   
    3449 3446, 3448   
  347 345-346     
Fabricated 
Metal 
Products 
3496-97   349 excl 3496-97 348   
 
(continued on the next page)
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Appendix 1 (continued) 
 
    3519 352 3511 
    3543-4-5 3546 353, 3541-42 
     
    3562, 3566   3547 thru 3561
     
357 thru 3585 
excl. 3582 
3563-64-65, 
3567-68-69, 
3582, 3586, 
3589 
Non-
Electrical 
Machinery, 
Machined 
Parts, & 
Tooling 
    359 excl 3596   3596 
         
    3613   3612 
    362 
363, 364 excl 
3647, 365, 366    
    3647    
    367     
Electricals & 
Electronics 
    3691, 3694  
3692, 3695, 
3699   
    3714 
3711, 3713, 
3715, 3716, 
3721, 373, 374, 
375, 3761, 379    
    3724, 3728     
Transpor- 
tation 
Equipment 
    3764, 3769     
Instruments       38   
    3915 391 excl 3915   
      
393, 394, 395, 
3961   
Consumer 
Products 
3996   3965 399 excl 3996   
 
 79
Appendix 2.  Regression Results:  
Full Utilization and LeanEffects on Productivity and Profitability 
(PBS Data) 
 netprof - pretax profit rate 
 vafte - productivity as measured by value-added per FTE 
 el, ..., pp - industry dummies (one sector excluded) 
 runyr - hours per year typical production machine running parts 
 turns - inventory turns 
 
regress vafte  el lv mb mf mpa mep pp runyr turns 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS                   Number of obs =     428 
-------------+------------------------------             F(  9,   418) =         5.62 
       Model |  7.6239e+10     9  8.4710e+09            Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  6.2994e+11   418  1.5070e+09            R-squared     =  0.1080 
-------------+------------------------------             Adj R-squared =  0.0888 
       Total |  7.0618e+11   427  1.6538e+09            Root MSE      =   38821 
 
       vafte |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
          el |    -2278.004   9937.807    -0.23   0.819    -21812.31     17256.3 
          lv |      13289.65    8245.18     1.61   0.108    -2917.535    29496.83 
          mb |   36409.77   10996.31     3.31   0.001     14794.81    58024.72 
          mf |    16951.02   6365.231     2.66   0.008     4439.167    29462.87 
         mpa |   14145.66   6912.264     2.05   0.041     558.5354    27732.79 
         mep |   16693.84   7253.489     2.30   0.022     2435.982     30951.7 
          pp |   -727.6754   14190.76    -0.05   0.959    -28621.81    27166.46 
       runyr |   438.7911   143.5394     3.06   0.002     156.6421    720.9401 
       turns |   720.6688   151.6392     4.75   0.000     422.5984    1018.739 
       _cons |   40302.84    7203.04     5.60   0.000     26144.15    54461.54 
 
regress netprof  el lv mb mf mpa pp mep runyr turns 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS                Number of obs =     417 
-------------+------------------------------              F(  9,   407) =    2.71 
       Model |  4463.40652     9  495.934057            Prob > F      =  0.0044 
    Residual |  74356.5471   407  182.694219            R-squared     =  0.0566 
-------------+------------------------------             Adj R-squared =  0.0358 
       Total |  78819.9536   416  189.471042            Root MSE      =  13.516 
 
     netprof |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
          el |       2.427704   3.520483     0.69   0.491    -4.492896    9.348303 
          lv |     -3.380476   2.946311    -1.15   0.252    -9.172361    2.41141 
          mb |   -12.37137   3.965751    -3.12   0.002    -20.16728   -4.575457 
          mf |   -.8226913   2.293663    -0.36   0.720    -5.331596    3.686213 
         mpa |  -.6170922   2.480792    -0.25   0.804    -5.493857    4.259672 
          pp |      1.888        4.968782     0.38   0.704     -7.87968    11.65568 
         mep |   1.180246   2.609491     0.45   0.651    -3.949515    6.310008 
       runyr |   .1095473   .0507849     2.16   0.032     .0097139    .2093808 
       turns |    .0235504   .0534371     0.44   0.660    -.0814968    .1285976 
       _cons |   10.58021   2.620281     4.04   0.000     5.429231    15.73118 
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Appendix 3.  
Estimating Component Sector Employment, Wages, and Unionization 
 
 
The Current Population Survey (CPS) does not identify all the four-digit SIC codes that 
comprise the component sector as defined in this report.  (For a list of those SIC codes, 
see Appendix 1.)  Although CPS industry codes sometimes correspond exactly to a 
particular 3- or 4-digit SIC code, they are more often combinations of 3- or 4-digit SIC 
codes.  (A Census Bureau crosswalk between CPS and SIC industry codes makes it 
possible to determine which SIC codes make up a particular CPS industry code.)   
 
Therefore, the following method was used to estimate employment, wage, and 
unionization variables in cases in which the CPS was the preferred or only data source.  
For each year 1988-2000, the share of employment in each CPS industry code that 
consisted of component sector SIC codes was estimated using BLS ES-202 data, which 
include nationwide employment in all 3- and 4-digit SIC codes.  CPS data for each of 
these years were then re-weighted by multiplying this share by the CPS weight for each 
observation. 
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Appendix 4.  
Comparative Means, Union vs. Non-Union Plants 
(PBS data) 
 
 1997-98 2002-03 
 Average Values Average Values 
Variables Union Non-Union Gap Union Non-Union Gap 
  N=179 N=937   (N=87) (N=555)   
Avg. shop floor hourly wage $13.11 $11.42 $1.69 ** $14.17 $13.77 $0.40
Value-added (=sales less 
purchases) per full-time 
equivalent (2000 labor hours) $72,600 $64,400 $8200 ** $75,000 $69,400 $5,600
$ Equipment per full-time 
equivalent (2000 labor hours) $56,900 $38,800 
$18,100
** $58,700 $59,100 -$400
Employee turnover rate 22.70% 32.30% -9.6% * 33.30% 40.10% -6.80%
% Shop workers covered by 
employer-provided health 
insurance 88.00% 70.90% 17.1% ** 82.20% 69.70% 12.5% **
Labor costs as a % of sales 27.70% 29.50% -1.8% * 27.60% 33.30% -5.7% **
Gross profits (sales less cost 
of goods sold) as % of sales 28.60% 32.40% -3.8% ** 23.50% 27.60% -4.1% *
Costs for temps as % labor 
costs 1.80% 3.63% -1.83% ** 2.01% 2.96% -0.95%
2-year % change in sales 18.10% 28.20% -10.10% -5.18% -0.32% -4.86%
Total employees 213 108 105 ** 172 91 81**
% Sales to auto industry 49.50% 34.00% 15.5% ** 64.10% 45.80% 18.3% **
% Sales from products of own 
design 30.70% 33.70% -3.00% 23.30% 22.30% 1.00%
% Shop workers trained in 
statistical quality concepts 35.90% 30.70% 5.20% 43.90% 35.70% 8.2% *
% Shop workers trained in 
technical concepts 35.10% 35.30% -0.20% 39.60% 37.40% 2.20%
Training $ per shop floor 
worker $184 $306 -$122 $160 $206 -$46
% Shop workers in teams 16.70% 23.60% -6.9% * 23.70% 18.30% 5.40%
# Keyboards/keypads per 
employee 0.22 0.26 -0.04 * 0.31 0.4 -0.09 *
% Employees using 
computers  43.40% 47.30% -3.90% 61.90% 61.20% 0.70%
** Significant at higher than 99% level      
* Significant at 90-99% level       
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Appendix 5. Regression Analysis, Union/Non-Union Wage Gap 
(PBS Data) 
 
For 1997-98 and 2002-03, we present three regressions, one each on avgwage, 
pbswage, and healthpct.  Please see variable definitions below. 
 
avgwage is a somewhat noisy measure of wages, from shop worker payroll divided 
by shop worker hours (but sometimes respondents define "shop workers"      
differently in the 2 sections of the questionnaire, so the average wage is 
prone to error) 
pbswage is a better wage measure, a weighted average of hourly wages by worker 
 type, but is only available for a subset of pbs participants 
healthpct is percent of shop workers covered by employer-provided health 
 insurance 
localwage97 is average wage in plant's county, a measure of local job market 
 conditions 
el, lv, mb, mf, mpa, miscauto and other are industry sector dummy variables 
lnemp is natural log of total employment, a measure of plant size 
vafte is value-added per full-time equivalent 
kfte is replacement value of machinery and equipment per full-time equivalent 
trnshop is spending on training per shop worker 
auto is percent sales to auto industry 
eto is percent of sales that are one-of-a-kind, engineered to order 
jobshop is percent of sales from "job shop" type orders that are short-term,  
   non-repeating 
comptr is percent of employees using computers as part of their jobs 
uniondum is union dummy variable 
 
 
1997-98: reg avgwage localwage el lv mb mf mp miscauto other 
lnemp vafte kfte trnshop auto eto jobshop comptr uniondum  
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     641 
-------------+------------------------------           F( 17,   623) =   23.04 
       Model |  4853.25302    17  285.485472           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  7719.66586   623   12.391117           R-squared     =  0.3860 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.3693 
       Total |  12572.9189   640  19.6451858           Root MSE      =  3.5201 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     avgwage |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 localwage97 |   .0037964   .0012905     2.94   0.003     .0012622    .0063306 
          el |   .2023155   .6416379     0.32   0.753     -1.05772    1.462351 
          lv |   4.524433   .8085146     5.60   0.000     2.936689    6.112177 
          mb |   1.467011   .6031893     2.43   0.015     .2824809    2.651542 
          mf |   .4762639   .4549382     1.05   0.296    -.4171342    1.369662 
         mpa |   1.698134   .4254819     3.99   0.000     .8625814    2.533686 
    miscauto |   1.203913   .7399672     1.63   0.104    -.2492191    2.657045 
       other |   1.429805   .6252973     2.29   0.023     .2018589     2.65775 
       lnemp |    .008844   .1489369     0.06   0.953    -.2836351    .3013231 
       vafte |   .0000444   5.30e-06     8.38   0.000      .000034    .0000548 
        kfte |   .0000123   3.99e-06     3.09   0.002     4.49e-06    .0000202 
     trnshop |   7.37e-06   .0000562     0.13   0.896    -.0001031    .0001178 
        auto |  -.0083707   .0039244    -2.13   0.033    -.0160774    -.000664 
         eto |   .0449852   .0077524     5.80   0.000     .0297612    .0602092 
     jobshop |   .0194282   .0054209     3.58   0.000     .0087828    .0300735 
      comptr |   .0078616   .0049679     1.58   0.114    -.0018942    .0176174 
    uniondum |    .629031   .4118398     1.53   0.127    -.1797314    1.437793 
       _cons |   3.915177   1.037494     3.77   0.000     1.877769    5.952585 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
1997-98: reg pbswage localwage el lv mb mf mp lnemp vafte kfte 
trnshop auto eto jobshop comptr uniondum  
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     392 
-------------+------------------------------           F( 15,   376) =   37.25 
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       Model |  2386.69218    15  159.112812           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  1605.94292   376  4.27112478           R-squared     =  0.5978 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.5817 
       Total |   3992.6351   391   10.211343           Root MSE      =  2.0667 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     pbswage |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 localwage97 |   .0039601   .0009948     3.98   0.000     .0020041    .0059162 
          el |  -1.189786   .5952168    -2.00   0.046    -2.360157   -.0194149 
          lv |   4.839526   .6064341     7.98   0.000     3.647099    6.031953 
          mb |   2.457658   .5236483     4.69   0.000     1.428011    3.487304 
          mf |   1.675108   .3245324     5.16   0.000     1.036982    2.313234 
         mpa |   2.764613   .3396412     8.14   0.000     2.096779    3.432448 
       lnemp |   .4229427   .1172741     3.61   0.000     .1923475     .653538 
       vafte |   .0000133   4.27e-06     3.12   0.002     4.91e-06    .0000217 
        kfte |   .0000108   3.23e-06     3.33   0.001     4.40e-06    .0000171 
     trnshop |    .000011   .0000334     0.33   0.742    -.0000547    .0000766 
        auto |  -.0089612   .0027154    -3.30   0.001    -.0143005   -.0036219 
         eto |   .0318657   .0061974     5.14   0.000     .0196798    .0440516 
     jobshop |   .0171113   .0050386     3.40   0.001     .0072039    .0270186 
      comptr |   .0099756   .0037233     2.68   0.008     .0026544    .0172968 
    uniondum |   1.120302   .3064028     3.66   0.000     .5178243     1.72278 
       _cons |   3.423263   .8266014     4.14   0.000     1.797922    5.048604 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
1997-98: reg healthpct localwage el lv mb mf mp lnemp vafte kfte 
trnshop auto eto  jobshop comptr uniondum  
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     388 
-------------+------------------------------           F( 15,   372) =    4.00 
       Model |  62191.4367    15  4146.09578           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  385333.277   372  1035.84214           R-squared     =  0.1390 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.1042 
       Total |  447524.714   387  1156.39461           Root MSE      =  32.185 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   healthpct |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 localwage97 |   .0442835   .0155892     2.84   0.005     .0136294    .0749376 
          el |  -11.91163   7.184911    -1.66   0.098    -26.03976    2.216501 
          lv |   19.28392   10.15198     1.90   0.058    -.6785465    39.24639 
          mb |   19.44912   7.687259     2.53   0.012     4.333188    34.56505 
          mf |   12.31861   5.036832     2.45   0.015      2.41438    22.22285 
         mpa |   1.865348   4.737437     0.39   0.694    -7.450164    11.18086 
       lnemp |   1.073375   1.786653     0.60   0.548     -2.43983    4.586579 
       vafte |   7.74e-06   .0000643     0.12   0.904    -.0001187    .0001341 
        kfte |   .0000996   .0000506     1.97   0.050     1.43e-07    .0001991 
     trnshop |   .0002905   .0005203     0.56   0.577    -.0007326    .0013137 
        auto |   .0918154   .0428071     2.14   0.033     .0076411    .1759898 
         eto |  -.0443413    .108569    -0.41   0.683    -.2578272    .1691446 
     jobshop |   .0199458   .0661016     0.30   0.763    -.1100339    .1499255 
      comptr |  -.0003038    .055847    -0.01   0.996    -.1101191    .1095115 
    uniondum |   7.763289   4.670564     1.66   0.097    -1.420729    16.94731 
       _cons |   31.17476   12.12008     2.57   0.010     7.342308    55.00722 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 84
2002-03: reg avgwage localwage el ht lv mb mf mp miscauto other 
lnemp vafte kfte trnshop auto eto jobshop comptr uniondum  
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     411 
-------------+------------------------------           F( 18,   392) =   17.16 
       Model |   5575.6146    18  309.756366           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |   7074.9427   392  18.0483232           R-squared     =  0.4407 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.4151 
       Total |  12650.5573   410  30.8550178           Root MSE      =  4.2483 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     avgwage |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   localwage |   .0024138    .001659     1.45   0.146    -.0008478    .0056754 
          el |  -1.269475   .9672014    -1.31   0.190    -3.171026    .6320758 
          ht |   2.882477   3.082272     0.94   0.350    -3.177375    8.942329 
          lv |   5.081243   1.173209     4.33   0.000     2.774675    7.387811 
          mb |   7.354282   1.465304     5.02   0.000     4.473445    10.23512 
          mf |   2.236672   .7104149     3.15   0.002     .8399724    3.633372 
          mp |   2.130839   .7525881     2.83   0.005     .6512256    3.610453 
    miscauto |   .4943924   1.053668     0.47   0.639    -1.577154    2.565939 
       other |  -.5585948   1.277758    -0.44   0.662     -3.07071    1.953521 
       lnemp |  -.0232937   .2420281    -0.10   0.923    -.4991291    .4525417 
       vafte |   .0000401   7.28e-06     5.52   0.000     .0000258    .0000544 
        kfte |   .0000118   4.05e-06     2.91   0.004     3.84e-06    .0000198 
     trnshop |   .0003267   .0006845     0.48   0.633     -.001019    .0016723 
        auto |  -.0221087   .0060805    -3.64   0.000    -.0340633   -.0101542 
         eto |    .035671   .0129445     2.76   0.006     .0102217    .0611203 
     jobshop |   .0271176   .0113569     2.39   0.017     .0047895    .0494457 
      comptr |  -.0008372    .007709    -0.11   0.914    -.0159932    .0143189 
    uniondum |    .183479   .7039101     0.26   0.794    -1.200432     1.56739 
       _cons |   7.160844   1.820018     3.93   0.000     3.582626    10.73906 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
2002-03: reg pbswage localwage el lv mb mf mp lnemp vafte kfte 
trnshop auto eto jobshop comptr uniondum  
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     330 
-------------+------------------------------           F( 15,   314) =   35.77 
       Model |  2578.11483    15  171.874322           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |   1508.8015   314  4.80510031           R-squared     =  0.6308 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.6132 
       Total |  4086.91632   329  12.4222381           Root MSE      =  2.1921 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     pbswage |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   localwage |   .0036503   .0009668     3.78   0.000      .001748    .0055525 
          el |  -1.039802   .5612848    -1.85   0.065    -2.144157    .0645523 
          lv |   4.567391   .6926966     6.59   0.000     3.204477    5.930304 
          mb |   4.590207   .8169844     5.62   0.000     2.982751    6.197663 
          mf |   2.008461   .3849057     5.22   0.000      1.25114    2.765781 
          mp |   3.024152   .4217387     7.17   0.000     2.194361    3.853943 
       lnemp |  -.0610748   .1457591    -0.42   0.675    -.3478628    .2257131 
       vafte |    .000019   4.16e-06     4.57   0.000     .0000108    .0000272 
        kfte |   6.74e-06   2.42e-06     2.79   0.006     1.98e-06    .0000115 
     trnshop |   .0004081   .0003387     1.20   0.229    -.0002583    .0010745 
        auto |  -.0024896   .0034028    -0.73   0.465    -.0091847    .0042055 
         eto |   .0253775   .0075147     3.38   0.001      .010592     .040163 
     jobshop |   .0188913   .0069807     2.71   0.007     .0051565    .0326261 
      comptr |   .0078626   .0044821     1.75   0.080    -.0009563    .0166814 
    uniondum |   .0482343   .3988563     0.12   0.904    -.7365345    .8330031 
       _cons |   6.750515   1.014206     6.66   0.000     4.755017    8.746014 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
2002-03: reg healthpct localwage el lv mb mf mp lnemp vafte kfte 
trnshop auto eto jobshop comptr uniondum 
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      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     408 
-------------+------------------------------           F( 15,   392) =    4.96 
       Model |  76480.3644    15  5098.69096           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  402803.013   392  1027.55871           R-squared     =  0.1596 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.1274 
       Total |  479283.377   407  1177.60044           Root MSE      =  32.056 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   healthpct |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   localwage |   .0021652   .0126689     0.17   0.864    -.0227422    .0270726 
          el |   2.357204   6.838303     0.34   0.731    -11.08713    15.80154 
          lv |   20.69938   8.378679     2.47   0.014     4.226611    37.17215 
          mb |   8.971456   10.52882     0.85   0.395    -11.72857    29.67148 
          mf |   19.90594   4.686329     4.25   0.000     10.69246    29.11943 
          mp |   16.11308   4.989721     3.23   0.001     6.303115    25.92304 
       lnemp |   .0371147   1.867133     0.02   0.984    -3.633732    3.707961 
       vafte |   .0001454    .000055     2.64   0.009     .0000373    .0002535 
        kfte |   .0000665   .0000285     2.33   0.020     .0000104    .0001225 
     trnshop |  -.0055247   .0045065    -1.23   0.221    -.0143847    .0033352 
        auto |   .0280108   .0438986     0.64   0.524    -.0582953    .1143169 
         eto |   .0522906   .1004212     0.52   0.603    -.1451409    .2497221 
     jobshop |    .071061   .0841051     0.84   0.399    -.0942925    .2364144 
      comptr |   .0079748   .0585273     0.14   0.892    -.1070918    .1230415 
    uniondum |   12.93593    5.29044     2.45   0.015      2.53474    23.33711 
       _cons |    41.1567   13.50722     3.05   0.002     14.60105    67.71236 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Appendix 6. Trade Model Results, Five Upper Great Lakes States 
(Source: REMI runs) 
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